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ABSTRACT
The environmental injustice evident in the events that led to the Flint Water
Crisis shocked the nation and beyond. How could water from a municipal source with
systematic measures in place for safeguarding be a source of harm to an entire
community? Theoretical motivation for this study is rooted in Freudenburg’s (1993)
concept of “recreancy,” the failure of government institutions to discharge their
responsibilities to citizens appropriately and reliably. Researchers have documented
recreancy in institutional responses to technological disasters, but it remains unclear
what routine behaviors in government institutions lead to failure.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1 The Research Problem ...................................................................................... 1
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1
Freudenburg’s Conception of Recreancy........................................................................ 2
Criticism of Analysts’ Empirical Use of Recreancy .......................................................... 4
The Unit of Analysis .................................................................................................... 4
The Object of Perception ............................................................................................ 5
The Social Consequences of Recreancy ...................................................................... 5
Research Questions Based on Freudenburg’s Conception ............................................. 6
The Flint Water Crisis ...................................................................................................... 7
Chapter 2 The Research Strategy ..................................................................................... 11
Archival Data Sources ................................................................................................... 11
Analytical Technique: Thematic Analysis ...................................................................... 12
Application of Thematic Analysis to Case Study Data .................................................. 14
Chapter 3 Case Study ....................................................................................................... 17
The Political-Economic Backstory to Flint’s Water Crisis .............................................. 17
General Motors: Exploitation and Desertion ............................................................ 18
Political Exacerbation of Flint’s Financial Straits ...................................................... 20
Hijacking Statutory Revenue Sharing Funds ............................................................. 21
Scaling Up the Emergency Manager Law.................................................................. 22
Institutional Decision .................................................................................................... 24
The Budget ................................................................................................................ 24
Institutional Action—The April 25, 2014 Water Switch................................................ 26
LeeAnne Walters—Lead Epicenter ........................................................................... 27
GM Quit..................................................................................................................... 27
Legionella and the Water .......................................................................................... 29
Anger Rising .............................................................................................................. 30
Intra-institution Conversations on Legionella .......................................................... 31
Cross-Institution Confusion on Corrosion Control.................................................... 33
Contentious Colloquies ............................................................................................. 36
EPA’s March 26 Conference Call ............................................................................... 39
Institutional Deception ............................................................................................. 40
Del Toral’s Memo ...................................................................................................... 42
Lead Story Breaks ...................................................................................................... 43
The Children .............................................................................................................. 48
Institutional Acknowledgment: The Lead Problem ...................................................... 48
Pressure Building on Legionnaires’ Disease.............................................................. 49
New Year, More Scandal ........................................................................................... 51
Institutional Acknowledgement: Legionnaires’ Disease Outbreak .............................. 51
Epilog............................................................................................................................. 53
Chapter 4 Institutional Failures and Environmental Illness ............................................. 54
viii

Institutional Resources ................................................................................................. 55
The Individual Behaviors of Institutional Actors ........................................................... 56
Rushing the Switch Despite Concerns ...................................................................... 57
No Corrosion Control ................................................................................................ 58
Not Enlisting Aid from EPA and CDC ......................................................................... 61
Discussion and Conclusions .......................................................................................... 62
Multi-Institutional Interactions..................................................................................... 63
List of References .............................................................................................................. 64
Appendices........................................................................................................................ 73
Appendix A: Hierarchy .................................................................................................. 74
Appendix B: Charges ..................................................................................................... 75
Vita .................................................................................................................................... 80

ix

CHAPTER 1
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
Introduction
Modern societies based on democratic principles, representative government,
and the rule of law inculcate in citizens a basic trust in their government institutions and
the expectation that the institutions will minimize the risks to citizens’ health, safety,
and environment. When institutions fail to manage risks responsibly, people are
harmed. Freudenburg held that institutional failures in risk management deserved
greater analytical attention from sociologists due to the nature of contemporary society.
Analysts such as Beck and Giddens contend that postwar modernization has
generated a risk society—a society organized around unique risks to public health and
safety created by complex, tightly coupled production technologies (Beck 1992, 1995,
1996; Giddens 1990, 1991). Risky technologies require multiple specialists to design,
implement, and regulate them. Because the technologies are incomprehensible to most
citizens, we are dependent on “whole armies of specialists” (Freudenburg 2003: 105).
Institutions and specialists charged with regulation of the technologies are granted
substantial power to define, estimate, and publicize the associated risks.
Freudenburg argued that risk society’s requirement of more specialists and more
risk managers renders risk management institutions more likely to fail than previously.
He developed the concept of recreancy to refer specifically to institutional failures and
contended that the study of risks and risk management be expanded beyond individual
perceptions of risk to include the larger institutional framework responsible for risk
management.
Many researchers have deployed the notion of recreancy in their empirical work.
But it generally fails to do justice to the full character of Freudenburg’s conception of
the term. My aim in this project is to address that deficiency.
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I first conduct a detailed examination of Freudenburg’s development of the
concept of recreancy. I then provide an overview of the use of the concept in the
literature to demonstrate the divergence of empirical applications of recreancy from
Freudenburg’s conception. I use a deeper understanding of recreancy to generate
research questions that better reflect elements of Freudenburg’s ideas. Empirically, I
look for evidence of those elements in a case study of the institutional failures in the
State of Michigan that resulted in the Flint water crisis.

Freudenburg’s Conception of Recreancy
Social institutions are enduring systems of patterned interactions and
relationship among members of society that structure and regulate the actions of
individuals. Institutions are crucial parts of society, mechanisms for maintaining social
order in vital areas of society—the family, religion, education, the economy, and the
political. Institutions are interdependent, integrated systems of norms and rules that
structure social interactions, governing not only the individual’s behavior but her
expectations of societal operations.
Citizens’ particular expectations of government institutions are that its
operations are transparent and accountable to the public and that institutional actors
are competent and responsible enough to attend to their prescribed obligations in ways
that can be counted on to protect citizens’ rights, maintain social order, and promote
the general welfare (Freudenburg 2000).
Liberal democratic governments are charged with two contradictory obligations:
to facilitate capital accumulation and to maintain legitimacy (O’Connor 2002).
Government institutions fulfill the accumulation obligation through policies supporting
the private sector’s pursuit of profits. Federal taxes on profits provide the government
with revenues. The government fulfills its legitimacy obligation by using its revenues to
provide social policies that benefit the majority of citizens, such as the Social Security
Act and Medicaid.
2

The obligations are inherently contradictory because they serve different social
classes: corporate elites benefit from the government’s accumulation obligation, while
middle and working classes benefit from the government’s legitimation obligation. One
obligation is fulfilled only at the expense of the other. The neoliberal agenda calls for an
emphasis on accumulation, which leads to pollution and the failure of institutions in
their obligations to manage risks to public health and safety.
Freudenburg urged analysts to adopt a more sociological, institutional level of
analysis in studies of risk management. Past studies, he observed, focused almost
exclusively on the individual characteristics of the risk manager or the risk perceiver
(Freudenburg 1993). But institutions can produce disastrous outcomes even when no
bad actor is identifiable. Often, Freudenburg contends, “the most significant failings are
not so much those of individuals as of organizations and institutions” (Freudenburg
1993: 917).
Freudenburg advocated for investigations of the influences of the larger
institutional context in which individual managers act. He claimed that, to discuss
institutional failure—the behaviors of institutions as well as of individuals—in the risk
society, “[w]e need a specialized word if we are to refer to behaviors of institutions or
organizations…” (1996: 47). He offered the concept of “recreancy” to describe cases in
which institutional responsibilities “are not being carried out properly—whether the
‘fault’ is one of individual actors or of a broader system in which important
responsibilities may fall through the institutional cracks” (1993: 915). Elsewhere, he
indicates that recreancy encompasses the “behaviors of persons and/or of institutions
that hold positions of trust, agency, responsibility, or fiduciary or other forms of broadly
expected obligations to the collectivity, but that behave in a manner that fails to fulfill
the obligations or merit the trust” (1993:916–17).
Because his focus was institutions, Freudenburg turned to Max Weber’s work to
flesh out his conception of recreancy. Weber described modern institutions and
organizations as characterized by a complex, interdependent division of labor which
3

specifies the regulations and duties assigned to distinct roles in an established hierarchy
of command. Individuals who fulfill those positions possess particular, certified
qualifications enabling them to maintain the regular and continuous execution of the
institution’s social obligations. The desired outcome is effective and efficient
institutional operations.
Freudenburg (1993) detected a paradox in regard to the interdependencies of an
increasingly complex division of labor distinguish the institutions in the risk society. On
the one hand, our current division of labor promotes institutional efficiency of
performance and permits a level of prosperity, prowess, and even physical health and
safety, that is altogether unprecedented. But, on the other hand, the division of labor
substantially increases the institution’s vulnerability to failure, where duties are not
carried out properly by institutional actors or where the responsibilities in a broader
system fall through the institutional cracks. Institutional failure – recreancy – is “the
failure of institutional actors to carry out their responsibilities with the degree of vigor
necessary to merit the societal trust they enjoy” (1993: 909). How has Freudenburg’s
conceptualization of recreancy been treated by other analysts?

Criticism of Analysts’ Empirical Use of Recreancy
I examine other analysts’ uses of the concept of recreancy with a focus on the
unit of analysis used in the study, the object of individuals’ perceptions regarding
recreancy, and the social consequences of recreancy to highlight the difference between
their uses of the concept with Freudenburg’s.

The Unit of Analysis
The hallmark of Freudenburg’s conceptualization of recreancy is his insistence on
the importance of viewing institutional failure at the institutional level of analysis. Yet
the individual is the unit of analysis in nearly all of the relatively sparse research
applying the concept of recreancy (Cope, Slack, Blanchard, and Lee 2016; Gill 2007; Gill,
Ritchie, and Picou 2016; Ladd 2012; Ladd, Gill, and Marszalek 2007; Marshall, Picou, and
4

Gill 2003; McSpirit, Scott, Hardesty, and Welch 2005; Picou, Marshall, and Gill 2004;
Ritchie, Gill, and Farnham 2013; Ritchie, Gill, and Long 2018; Sapp, Arnot, Fallon, Fleck,
Soorholtz, Sutton-Vermueulen, and Wilson 2009).

The Object of Perception
Regardless of the institution or the recreant act examined, research applying the
concept of recreancy regularly focuses on individuals’ perceptions. Studies of individuals’
perceptions related to the 1989 grounding of the Exxon-Valdez tanker and the
consequent oil spill in the Gulf of Alaska vary in the objects of perception, for example:
individual perceptions of recreancy (Ladd 2012; Ladd, Gill, and Marszalek 2007);
individual perceptions of blame (Ritchie, Gill, and Farnham 2013; Cope, Slack, Blanchard,
and Lee 2016; Ritchie, Gill, and Long 2018; Gill 2007; McSpirit, Scott, Hardesty, and
Welch 2005); perceptions of an institution as recreant (Cope, Slack, Blanchard, and Lee
2016), and perceptions of governmental or organizational failure (Picou, Marshall, and
Gill 2004).
Cope, Slack, Blanchard, and Lee (2016) and Ritchie, Gill, and Long (2018)
examined Individuals’ perceptions of distrust and blame related to the 2010 explosion
and fire on the Horizon drilling rig and subsequent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
Analytical attention to individuals’ perceptions of blame in technological disasters was
also drawn to Hurricane Katrina (Gill 2007; Ladd, Gill and Marszalek 2007), and a
Kentucky coal ash spill (McSpirit, Scott, Hardesty, and Welch 2005).

The Social Consequences of Recreancy
Several analysts examine the social consequences of recreancy. Sapp, Arnot,
Fallon, Fleck, Soorholtz, Sutton-Vermueulen, and Wilson (2009) report that recreancy
results in loss of consumer trust in the US food system. Several studies examine how
recreant institutions can result in corrosive communities (Picou, Marshall, and Gill 2004;
Ritchie, Gill, and Farnham 2013).
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A number of researchers describe a variety of psychosocial impacts of
institutional recreancy, including: heightened perceptions of risk, high levels of
psychological distrust, and loss of trust in institutional support systems (Picou, Marshall,
and Gill 2004; Ladd, Gill, and Marszalek 2007; Sapp, Arnot, Fallon, Fleck, Soorholtz,
Sutton-Vermueulen, and Wilson 2009); psychological stress and the loss of social capital
(Gill 2007); distrust in institutions (Cope, Slack, Blanchard, and Lee 2016) (Gill, Ritchie,
and Picou 2016); anger, frustration, despair, and demands for accountability (Ladd, Gill,
and Marszalek 2007); and secondary stress and long-term psychosocial issues (Marshall,
Picou, and Gill 2003).

Research Questions Based on Freudenburg’s Conception
Freudenburg emphasized the need to move past studies of individuals in risk
studies. He advocated investigations using the lens of the institutional unit of analysis to
focus on the behaviors of institutional actors as they are influenced by institutional
arrangements. I developed three research questions formed specifically from elements
of Freudenburg’s conceptualization of recreancy. I used the following elements from
Freudenburg’s concept of recreancy to develop my first research question:


“[W]ork to date needs to be complemented with work that focuses on the
organizations that are responsible for managing risks and on the larger societal
context in which we live” (Freudenburg 2003: 102).



Given periodic pressures for organizations to cut costs: “Organizations will
generally seek to protect what they consider to be their core functions and cut
back on those they consider peripheral” (Freudenburg 2003: 116).



“[P]rotection of health, safety, and the environment tends to be secondary”
(Freudenburg 2003: 117).

Research Question 1: Is the level of institutional resources adequate for enabling officials
to carry out their responsibilities with the degree of vigor necessary to merit the societal
trust they enjoy?
6

I used the following elements from Freudenburg’s work to develop my second
research question:


“[W]e need a specialized word if we are to refer to behaviors as well as of
individuals and, importantly, if the focus of attention is to be on actual
behaviors” (1996: 47).



“Rather than responding to the substance of citizen complaints, policy makers
employ diversionary reframing—divert attention away from citizens’ real
concerns by reframing the debate as being about something else” (Freudenburg
2003: 119) and “ …calling into question the legitimacy of citizen concerns about
those institutional failings” (Freudenburg 1993: 917).



Institutional actors…are likely to have considerable interest in claiming that their
own behaviors reflect responsibility and competence (Freudenburg 1993: 917).



Frequently, the institutional actors with the greatest monitoring authority have
interests that systematically differ from those of the larger society (Freudenburg,
O’Leary, and Wilson 1999). “Threats to public health, safety, and the
environment are often embedded in a particular structure of interests in which a
small but powerful set of actors will stand to benefit from policy actions that can
create serious problems for society-at-large” (Freudenburg, O’Leary, and Wilson
1999: 6).

Research Question 2: What behaviors by which institutional actors resulted in
recreancy?

The Flint Water Crisis
I use the research questions that reflect Freudenburg’s concept of recreancy in
an exploratory case study of institutional failures in Flint, Michigan, a decaying rust-belt
city with a majority African American population. The multiple failures of state, county,
and city government institutions resulted in contaminated drinking water that caused
elevated blood lead levels in residents and a lethal outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease.
7

The institutional failures are nested within Flint’s long-term financial problems. I
investigate the recreant actions of state and local governmental officials that led to the
multi-faceted phenomenon to which I refer as the Flint Water Crisis.
In 2011, Michigan Governor Rick Snyder placed the City of Flint, a majority
African American city, under state receivership because of financial debts. Consistent
with state law, the governor appointed an emergency manager to operate the city.
Michigan’s law granted emergency managers broad authority to implement austerity
measures to restore financial solvency.
In 2013, Flint’s emergency manager decided to reduce city expenditures by
ending the city’s contract for drinking water with the Detroit Water and Sewerage
Department (DWSD) in favor of a new water utility. Since the new company’s pipeline
was under construction, the emergency manager ordered that the city’s old water
distribution system be used as a temporary source. The 50-year old water treatment
plant would draw and treat the corrosive water from the Flint River, polluted for
decades by General Motors factories, and distribute it via old pipelines to Flint homes,
schools, and businesses.
The switchover to Flint River water was made in April 2014. Residents’
complaints about water quality followed almost immediately. Officials from the
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality determined that corrosion control
chemicals need not be added to water at the treatment plant.
In October 2015, Governor Snyder released a 10-point action plan to address
high lead levels in the Flint’s drinking water. He was responding to scientific studies that
found high lead levels in the drinking water and high blood lead levels in children. Flint’s
water distribution system was shut down and the city again contracted with DWSD for
drinking water.
The governor held a press conference in January 2016 to announce that
outbreaks of Legionnaires’ disease that occurred in the summer months of 2014 and
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2015 had killed 12 people in the Flint region. The outbreaks were linked to the 2014
change in drinking water source.
In 2017, 15 current or former government officials were criminally charged in
connection with the Legionnaires’ disease outbreak. The disastrous outcome was the
complex product of a broad series of decisions and non-decisions by government
institutional officials at state, county, and local levels.
Bacterial microbes are ubiquitous in water distribution systems. Bacteria grow
and attach to the inner surfaces of pipelines with biofilm, the slime formed by bacteria
for protection from disinfecting agents.
The highly corrosive water from the Flint River left the water treatment plant
without the addition of corrosive control chemicals. The corrosive water coursing
through Flint’s old lead service lines eroded the biofilm. Bacteria were released into the
water and multiplied.
When elevated levels of coliform bacteria were detected, more chlorine was
added to the treatment. The chlorine boost made the water even more corrosive and it
ate into the pipe itself, causing heavy metals such as lead, iron, and copper to leach into
the water. Lead levels exceeded legal limits, and children manifested high blood lead
levels.
Legionella bacteria are commonly found in water distribution systems without
reaching a level that causes disease. But the bacteria’s growth is accelerated by the
presence of iron and in warm temperatures. Since Flint’s water contained iron,
Legionella bacteria rapidly increased in summer months.
If different decisions had been made by institutional actors at any point, the
impacts of the water contamination could have been mitigated. In fact, if corrosion
control chemicals had been added to the water treatment as soon as the switch to Flint
River water was made, a water crisis would have been unlikely.
The case study of the Flint Water Crisis is well-suited for playing out
Freudenburg’s conceptualization of recreancy. The maintenance of safe drinking water
9

requires neither sophisticated technology nor esoteric knowledge—counter to risk
society theorists’ focus on dramatic cases of risk management. But Freudenburg urged
researchers to examine more common risks: “We will learn more by focusing not on the
dramatic risks of a nuclear Armageddon but on more mundane types of risks unlikely to
endanger all life on earth but still raise significant concern” (2003: 102). After a
description of the research strategy, I will turn to the story of the mundane risks
associated with the Flint Water Crisis.

10

CHAPTER 2
THE RESEARCH STRATEGY
I conducted an exploratory case study of the Flint Water Crisis drawing on
archival data which I analyzed thematically. Since criminal cases are ongoing, predicted
dates of trial completions cannot be made. I elected to run the case study from January
1, 2011 through December 2018. This date range captures relevant events that occurred
since the Michigan governor first declared the City of Flint under the Emergency
Manager Law and covers the period in which national discussion on the water crisis
emerged.

Archival Data Sources
Under pressure from the public, Michigan Governor Rick Snyder released, in
multiple batches that started in January 2016, all email communications about the Flint
Water Crisis that were routed through his office. The email contents were publicized in a
wide array of news outlets. I did not use the emails themselves as a data source because
of the prohibitive costs in time and in the conversion of the emails to an easily
searchable data base.
I instead turned to news articles written by investigative journalists with access
to the emails. Most of the articles were published after the governor’s January 2016
press conference. These articles revealed the factual actions of institutional actors
during the crisis, behaviors that often contradicted the reported actions at the time of
the incidents.
I collected news stories from two sources that focused on the Flint Water Crisis.
The Flint Journal/MLive presented the local perspective. MLive is a web-based
consortium of several former community newspapers including the Flint Journal. These
news sources present local perspectives, featuring interviews with Flint residents and
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officials and providing detailed information about state government operations relative
to the crisis.
A more regional perspective of the water crisis was projected in news coverage
by The Detroit News, one of two major daily newspapers in Detroit. It serves the
metropolis and six surrounding counties and is the largest media market close to Flint.
The Detroit News’s stories about Flint aim at a broader readership, carrying perhaps
fewer details but greater context.
I identified relevant articles with search terms such as “Flint water crisis,”
“Legionnaires’ disease,” “Flint, Michigan,” and “Legionella.” I copied or downloaded all
relevant articles, placing them in chronological order from oldest to newest stories. This
1,858-page file composed my raw data. Next, I summarized each article from each
source in two new documents. I then merged the summary documents and treated
these combined chronological summaries as the 296-page database for thematic
analysis.
News Source

Pages of Articles

Pages of Summaries

Flint Journal/MLive.com

720

221

Detroit News

1138

75

1858 total pages of

296 total pages of articles

Totals

articles

Analytical Technique: Thematic Analysis
Thematic analysis is a technique for identifying patterns or themes in qualitative
data (Maguire and Delahunt 2017). The technique organizes and describes the data in a
detailed, nuanced account (Braun and Clarke 2006).
The goal is to identify important themes in the database that address research
questions or say something about an issue. Thematic analysis goes beyond a mere
summary, progressing from a description of organized patterns in the data to an
12

interpretation of the patterns, a theorization of the significance of the patterns and
their broader implications (Braun and Clarke 2006).
Thematic analysis involves a number of choices for researchers which are often
not made explicit (Braun and Clarke 2005). Several analysts have examined multiple
qualitative studies with the aim of presenting clear guidelines in the analytical process
laid out in stages. The stages are non-linear; they have recursive, iterative relationships.
In many ways, the guidelines are elaborations of Yin’s (2011) model of analysis of
qualitative data. His model is predicated on his observation that most qualitative
analyses follow “a general, five-phased cycle” (2011: 176):
1. compiling: organizing all collected data;
2. disassembling: breaking down the compilation into pieces, coding;
3. reassembling and arraying: reorganizing the pieces into larger themes;
4. interpreting: creating a new narrative, an interpretation of the reassembled
data; and
5. concluding: drawing conclusions from the entire data set and the
interpretation.
Braun and Clarke (2006) specify a six-step process. Maguire and Delahunt (2017)
adapt Braun and Clarke’s framework by adding more detailed descriptions of each step.
This more detailed framework consists of the following stages:
1. become familiar with the data: reading and re-reading the transcripts, make
notes and jotting down early impressions;
2. generate initial codes: organize data in a meaningful and systematic way,
coding each segment of data that is relevant to or captures something
interesting about the research question;
3. search for themes: identify patterns in the coded data to organize them into
broader, descriptive themes that say something specific about the research
question;
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4. review themes: modify and develop the preliminary themes to assure that
they work in the context of the entire data set and are coherent and distinct
from one another;
5. define themes: identify the essence of each theme and the relations among
themes; and
6. writing-up: write the report, journal article, or dissertation.

Application of Thematic Analysis to Case Study Data
I found myself frequently moving back and forth among the thematic analysis of
the data, the theoretically informed shaping of research questions, and
operationalizations of concepts via themes. I integrated the insights from the adapted
model to set out the steps I took in performing the thematic analysis.
Step 1: Become familiar with the data and identify patterns.
I read and re-read the entire database, searching for meanings relevant to
institutional recreancy. Through this immersion in the database, I became familiar with
the depth and breadth of the content.
Step 2: Generate initial codes.
I broke down the database into smaller pieces via codes that reorganized the
data in ways that addressed my research questions. I coded as many small pieces as
possible, recognizing that codes would continue to be developed and defined
throughout the analysis.
Step 3: Search for themes and subthemes.
After all data were initially coded, I re-focused at a broader level of analysis. I
examined the codes in search of patterns and combined patterns into overarching
themes and subthemes. Some codes were discarded; others were combined. I
maintained “miscellaneous” code.
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Step 4: Review themes and subthemes.
I further review themes and subthemes, modifying as necessary and/or
developing new ones. I ensured themes were coherent and distinct from one other and
that the themes in toto make sense.
Step 5: Refine and title themes and subthemes.
I further refined the themes and reviewed the coded data within them. I devised
precise, descriptive titles for the themes to be used in the final analysis.
Step 6: Interpret.
I interpreted the data, developing a narrative that wove together my research
questions for the key analytic portion of my thesis.
Step 7: Conclude and reflect.
I returned to the larger issue driving this research: How are we to understand the
failures of government institutional actors to fulfill their responsibilities to the public? I
aimed to capture the broader significance of my findings. Using the research questions, I
developed from elements of Freudenburg’s conceptualization of recreancy, I analyzed
the database for evidence or themes that related to the research questions. Research
question 1 aimed at the institutional level of analysis; research question 2 aimed at
evaluating the individual level of analysis. The research questions and examples of
potential themes follow:
1. Is the level of institutional resources adequate for enabling officials to carry out
their responsibilities with the degree of vigor necessary to merit the societal
trust they enjoy?


Available state funding for training employees, hiring staff, and providing
necessary equipment and labs



Access to expert knowledge, protocol enforcement, incentives and
disincentives for performance of responsibilities.

2. What behaviors by which institutional actors resulted in recreancy?
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Specific behaviors of individuals, such as notifying appropriate institutions of
problems, issuing warnings to public, using sound scientific methods for
investigations



Intentionality of behaviors



Behaviors that should have occurred but did not



Reasons for recreant behavior, such as lack of knowledge, incompetence,
negligence, ordered by institutional superiors, self-interest
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CHAPTER 3
CASE STUDY
The City of Flint has accumulated a number of records in the last decade. It was
named the “arson capital” of the country in 2011. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
ranked Flint the most violent city in America in 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 (Ridley, G.,
2013, Jan. 17 ). In 2016, according to Census Bureau data, Flint had the nation's highest
poverty rate among the nation’s 599 largest municipalities, with 45 percent of residents
living below the poverty line (Adams 2017). The rate of childhood poverty was 58
percent, compared to the national rate of 18 percent.
This is the town that General Motors (GM) built—and abandoned, the town
that government betrayed, and the town that environmental illness struck. The
institutional failures—recreancy—that produced the environmental illnesses of lead
poisoning and Legionnaires’ disease in the Flint region are implicated in the criminal
charges filed against 15 individuals who held positions in government institutions. How
are we to understand these failures of governmental institutional actors to perform
their duties? I address this broad question in the next two chapters. In this chapter, I
present the story of Flint’s water crisis; in the next, I analyze the institutions and actors
that were recreant.
Here I offer a chronological, factual narrative of events in Michigan that brought
the institutional outcome of recreancy and the public health outcome of environmental
illnesses. I focus on the larger institutional context in which Flint’s story takes place, the
relevant government institutions and their characteristics, and the actions of
institutional participants.

The Political-Economic Backstory to Flint’s Water Crisis
The City of Flint was born as a racially segregated, company town in 1908, when
General Motors (GM) incorporated the city and established headquarters there. For
many years, Flint’s fortunes ricocheted from gain-to-loss, gain-to-loss. When GM left Flint
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for greener, more profitable pastures, the city fell into near financial ruin. Their financial
struggles were substantially aggravated by political maneuvering that further
impoverished the city and displaced local leaders.

General Motors: Exploitation and Desertion
Flint became a boomtown as GM produced its first million cars by 1919
(Schragger 2016), boasting low unemployment and high tax revenues from GM that the
city plowed into significant residential services and infrastructure. Flint’s fortunes fell
when the 1930s Great Depression forced automobile manufacturers, including GM, to
cut production by approximately 75 percent. Flint’s unemployment rate soared to
nearly 50 percent. Over half of Flint’s white families and 85 percent of the city’s African
American families received public aid (Michigan Civil Rights Commission 2017). Living
conditions deteriorated; population decreased. Many families left the state, and others
moved to rural areas surrounding the city to live in flimsy homes made from whatever
materials were at hand (Michigan Civil Rights Commission 2017).
Roosevelt’s New Deal and the need for war weapons and equipment ended the
depression. The nation’s postwar economy quickly expanded to unprecedented
proportion. GM brought prosperity back to greater Flint with 25,000 new jobs. The new
employment opportunities attracted a sizable population of workers and their families
from across the country, and Flint’s population grew.
But by 1960, GM had shifted much of its manufacturing capacity to multiple new
industrial complexes that the company built outside city limits where land costs were
lower. Federal policies encouraged such corporate moves by granting defense
contractors a tax deduction of 100 percent of the construction costs (Schragger 2016).
GM’s relocation reduced the city’s tax revenues, but the loss was expected to last
only until the city annexed the suburbs. With high expectations, the city council
supported GM’s move by building roads and providing water and sewer service. But
suburban residents opposed annexation and, instead, incorporated separate
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municipalities. Flint’s temporary losses became permanent, and the city began its long
downturn (Schragger 2016).
Michigan, like many manufacturing strongholds, was decimated by
deindustrialization between the 1970s and the 1990s. Throughout the country,
factories were shuttered, and manufacturing moved to suburbs, to anti-union states,
and to developing nations. Tax bases in Michigan’s cities plummeted, and services were
slashed—police and fire protection, maintenance of city parks and streets, and garbage
collection. Property values cratered, further reducing taxes and city revenues. Cities
stagnated in permanent fiscal crises, creating a cycle of failure (Linkon and Russo 2002).
Flint underwent deindustrialization after 1980 when GM moved manufacturing
facilities out of the city; good-paying jobs were gone for good (Alamy 2012) . GM’s last
operating assembly plant closed in June 1999. The grounds of what had been the largest
GM plant in the world were declared the largest brownfield site in the nation (Alamy
2012). The city’s tax base eroded, leaving an infrastructure that was built for a large
population to deteriorate further (Schragger 2016).
The combination of decreased populations and reduced property taxes
inevitably led to financial strains for Michigan’s municipalities. State legislators
responded by enacting laws allowing the state to take over local governments facing
financial crises. The 1988 Public Act 101 gave the state the authority to place a
municipality in state receivership and appoint an emergency financial manager. The law
was replaced in 1990 with PA 72, which established a state financial emergency review
board to assess a city for state receivership (Oosting, J. 2012, Dec. 27). The governor was
empowered to appoint an emergency manager for struggling cities. The sole task of the
emergency manager was to implement austerity measures to reduce city expenditures
and increase revenues.
I uncovered only one policy intended to increase Flint’s revenues: in October
2012 while under state receivership for the second time, Flint’s city lockup was
reopened. Out of commission since 2008, the facility could hold up to 110 inmates for a
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maximum of 72 hours (Adams, D., 2013, Sept. 11). But the governor’s office identified
numerous strategies for cutting the city’s spending.
Flint was first placed in state financial receivership in 2002. City Council members
tried to evade the state’s takeover by planning for $12 million in spending cuts (Adams,
2013, Sept. 11). But Governor John Engler overrode the council, declared a financial
emergency, and appointed Ed Kurtz as Flint’s first emergency manager (Mostafavi, B.
2011, Nov. 10). The city council sued in state court but failed to stop the receivership
(Adams 2013, Sept. 11; Mostafavi 2011, Nov. 10).
Emergency manager Kurtz cut expenditures by removing health, dental, and
vision benefits for most city officials and by cutting the mayor’s annual salary by over 70
percent and that of the nine council members by over 20 percent (Mostafavi, B. 2011,
Nov. 10). He closed the ombudsman’s office, raised residential water rates, laid off city
workers, temporarily closed the city’s recreation centers, and authorized infrastructure
projects to improve sewer and road systems (Goodin-Smith, O. ND).
The receivership was ended in 2004. But a subsequent series of actions taken
by federal and, mostly state, government institutions instigated Flint’s decline from
bad to worse and set the stage for the water crisis.

Political Exacerbation of Flint’s Financial Straits
During the 2010 state gubernatorial elections, Republican candidate Rick
Snyder’s campaign touted his business experience and facility with data (Lawler, E.,
2018, Dec. 31). Snyder was elected in November, prepared to demonstrate his
neoliberal bona fides.
In August 2011, State Treasurer Andy Dillon assessed the City of Flint’s
considerable financial deficit and declared it highly likely to experience a fiscal
emergency in the near future (Longley, K. 2012, Dec. 1). Governor Snyder appointed a
financial review committee and tasked them with determining whether Flint was
undergoing an actual financial emergency (Longley, K. 2012, Dec. 1). The review team
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agreed with Dillon and recommended that the governor appoint an emergency financial
manager (Longley, K. 2012, Dec. 1). Although several City Council members opposed the
city’s placement under state receivership (Longley, K., 2011, Sept. 14), the council voted
7-2 to accept the state’s declaration (Longley, K. 2012, Dec. 1).
The governor appointed Michael Brown as Flint’s second emergency manager
(Longley, K. 2012, Dec. 1). Brown laid off several top-level city appointees, eliminated
salaries of the mayor and city council members, and eradicated the offices of the
Ombudsman and Civil Service Commission (Longley, K. 2012, Dec. 1).
To assist the emergency manager in reducing Flint’s expenditures and display his
budgeting skills, Governor Snyder implemented two strategies: he changed the use of
revenue sharing funds and strengthened the emergency manager law.

Hijacking Statutory Revenue Sharing Funds
Michigan’s Revenue Sharing Act specifies that 21.3 percent of state sales tax
revenues be earmarked for statutory revenue sharing with municipalities based on
needs such as demand for expanded menus of services and lack of capacity to fund
services from locally-collected revenue sources (Murphy 2011, Oct. 16; Citizens
Research Council of Michigan 2015).
Because an earmark is merely a guideline and cannot mandate an appropriation,
statutory revenue sharing has typically not been fully funded (Stansell 2017). Instead,
the governor and legislature may adjust the distributed amount. State authorities have
increasingly used statutory revenue sharing funds to balance the state budget and pay
for cuts in business taxes (Lederman 2016 ; Michigan Municipal League 2014 ). Between
2003 and 2013, the state withheld over $6 billion dollars from Michigan
cities (Lederman 2016). In that period, the City of Flint lost close to $60 million in
statutory revenue sharing 2003 and 2013 (Lederman 2016).
Determined to impose new forms of market-based discipline on struggling
municipal governments, Snyder in 2011 implemented a new statutory revenue-sharing
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program that required cities to undertake market-friendly reforms—austerity measures
(Lederman 2016). To obtain their statutory revenue sharing payments, local
governments were required to participate in an economic vitality incentive program
that included increased transparency to citizens, benchmarking successes,
consolidation or privatization of services, and pension reform (Murphy 2011, Oct. 16).
Ideally, the thrust of the program was to position Michigan cities as businesses-friendly
sites (Lederman 2016).

Scaling Up the Emergency Manager Law
Michigan cities were struggling financially in the wake of the 2008 Great
Recession. The Michigan legislature, concerned that the nearly bankrupt cities
threatened the state's credit rating, passed Public Act 4, the 2011 Local Government and
School District Fiscal Accountability Act (Kossis 2012).
The controversial law allows the state government to place in receivership those
cities with negative economic health indicators, even if local officials oppose it. The
receiver, the emergency manager appointed by the governor, has nearly unlimited
authority, including: altering collective- bargaining agreements, firing elected officials,
privatizing or selling public assets, entering into contracts with municipal creditors, and
eliminating departments within city government (Kossis 2012; Landon 2012). The
emergency manager’s authority overrides that of locally elected officials, who are
barred from any actions without his prior written approval. The emergency manager can
sue to enforce compliance to his orders.
In April 2012, the state Board of Canvassers held a hearing on a petition to make
Public Act 4 subject to a state voting referendum (Longley, K. 2012, Dec. 1). The night
before the hearing, emergency manager Michael Brown issued 12 executive orders that
forced cuts in health care coverage for retirees (Adams, D. 2018, April 13), the Flint
police patrol officers’ union, and the general city employees’ union (Adams, D., 2018,
April 13; Adams, D., 2013, Sept. 11; Longley, K. 2012, Dec. 1).
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The petition case went to the state Supreme Court that ruled that the state
Board of Canvassers must certify a referendum on Public Act 4 on the November 2012
ballot (Longley, K. 2012, Dec. 1). Public Act 4 was suspended until the referendum vote,
putting Public Act 72 back into effect. PA 72 prohibited former city employees from
serving as emergency managers. Michael Brown, who had been temporary mayor in
2009, was forced to step down as emergency manager (Adams, D., 2013, May 30) and
Ed Kurtz replaced him (Longley, K. 2012, Dec. 1; Adams, D., 2013, Sept. 11; Adams, D.,
2013, May 3).
Michigan voters overturned PA 4 in the general election of 2012 (Adams, D.,
2013, Sept. 11). Just weeks after the repeal, the Legislature passed the Local Financial
Stability and Choice Act of 2012, or Public Act 436. PA 436 gave the governor significant
autonomy in appointing emergency managers who accountable only to the governor
and the Michigan Department of the Treasury (Lee 2016).
PA 436 responded to some of the criticisms of previous laws. It gave the local
governing body the authority to remove an emergency manager after one year with a
2/3 majority vote. It required the state to pay the emergency managers’ salaries instead
of requiring municipalities and school districts to do so (Oosting 2012, Dec. 27). On the
other hand, the law was immune to referendum, and it allowed emergency managers to
break union contracts if negotiations failed (Oosting 2012, Dec. 27).
The new law offered local officials in receivership the choice among four forms
of state intervention. Cities can choose among the following choices: 1.) a consent
agreement, which keeps local officials in charge; 2.) a neutral evaluation, mediation
similar to a pre-bankruptcy process; 3.) filing directly for chapter 9 bankruptcy; and 4.)
having an emergency manager appointed (Oosting 2012, Dec. 27). However, the
choices are constrained. A local government can choose consent agreement, for
example, but if the state treasurer does not agree with that approach. The city can be
forced to adopt one of the other options.
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PA 436 went into effect in March 2013. Under the new law, Ed Kurtz, who
remained in the emergency manager role, had increased “power to cover all conduct of
local governments, including finance and governance issues” (Ridley, G., 2016, March
24).
The impacts of the political and economic context of decreased funding and
diminished electoral power left the City of Flint highly vulnerable to crises. The match
struck that generated the water crisis was the decision made on the city’s behalf by
State Treasurer, Andy Dillon: to change the source of the city’s drinking water to the
highly polluted Flint River. In the following sections, I present the story of the Flint
Water Crisis.

Institutional Decision
The City of Flint had a serious revenue shortage. Therefore, the when
opportunity to leave the Detroit Water and Sewer Department (DWSD) and join the
Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA), was positioned as having the potential to save the
city at least $100 million over the next quarter of a century (Counts, J, 2016, May 3), the
City Council pursued the cost-saving strategy. On March 25, 2013, with a non-binding
vote of 7-1, the Flint City Council approved a resolution to join the new Karegnondi
Water Authority (KWA), which would be building a pipeline to Lake Huron. The pipeline
had not been built yet and was not expected to be for a few years (Ahmad, Z. 2019, June
19). According to Goodin-Smith the council “never approved using the river as the
interim water source for the city of Flint” (ND). Due to Flint’s receivership status, the
ultimate decision about Flint’s water move had to be made by State Treasurer Andy
Dillon.

The Budget
The following day Stephen Busch, who was employed with Michigan Department
of Environmental Quality’s (MDEQ) drinking water division, wrote an email to other DEQ
employees in which he warned that using the Flint river as a water source could result in
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multiple complications, including a rise in possibly cancer-causing by-products from
disinfectants and microbials in the water (Ridley, G., 2016, Feb. 14). Dan Wyant, MDEQ’s
director, forwarded Busch’s email to Treasurer Dillon accompanied with the agency’s
statement of support for the change. Wyant wrote, “All indications are that we are
supportive of KWA and its cost benefits compared to DWSD options […] If that is not the
answer you want tomorrow—then we should discuss" (Ridley, G., 2016, Feb. 14).
On April 17, Flint Emergency Manager Ed Kurtz informed DWSD of the city’s
intention to leave its services. The city’s water service contract was terminated by
Detroit the following day, with an effective date of April 2014 (Ahmad, Z. 2019, June 19).
Two months later Ed Kurtz approved a decree that apparently required the city to use
water from the river and updating the water treatment plant for full-time use. A memo
dated June 28, 2013 from Ed Kurtz to Andy Dillon revealed that the city was evaluating
its available options for temporary water sources including “high consideration” being
placed on utilizing water the Flint River or partially mixing it with water from Detroit
(Oosting, J., 2016, March 30).
Flint’s water treatment plant had not been used as a full-time facility in almost
half a century (Fonger, R., 2016, Feb. 28). Mike Glasgow, the city’s water treatment
plant supervisor, requested a six-month period for preparation ahead of the switch as
well as a hiring increase in is staff so that the number of plant staff could be restored to
the 2005 figure (when it was last used as a backup source), but his bosses, Public Works
Director Howard Croft and utilities administrator Duffy Johnson, denied Glasgow’s
request due to budgetary constraints (Oosting, J., 2016, March 30). On March 14, 2014
Glasgow sent a memo to a high-ranking member of the governor’s administration
cautioning that the hurried push to launch full-time production at the plant "could lead
to some big potential disasters down the road" (Oosting, J., 2016, March 30).
Two days later Glasgow reached out Adam Rosenthal, a water quality analyst for
MDEQ asking for guidance on water quality monitoring parameters and information
about lead and copper monitoring. Glasgow wrote, “I am expecting changes to our
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Water Quality Monitoring parameters, and possibly our DBP [Disinfection Byproducts
Rule] on lead & copper monitoring plan…Any information would be appreciated,
because it looks as if we will be starting the plant up tomorrow and are being pushed to
start distributing water as soon as possible” (FWATF Timeline, p.6).

Institutional Action—The April 25, 2014 Water Switch
It had been decided: The City of Flint would begin treating Flint River water on
April 25, 2014. The week before, on April 16 and 17, Mike Glasgow reached out to Adam
Rosenthal again, but this time he copied Mike Prysby, a district engineer for MDEQ, as
well as Stephen Bush, Prysby’s supervisor. Glasgow voiced his concern unambiguously:
I do not anticipate giving the ok to be sending water out anytime soon. If water is
distributed from this plant in the next couple of weeks, it will be against my
direction. I need time to adequately train additional staff and to update our
monitoring plans before I will feel we are ready. I will reiterate this to
management above me, but they seem to have their own agenda (FWATF
Timeline p. 6; Fleming, L, 2018, Feb. 23; Lynch, J., 2016, April 21).
Discouraged by the lack of attention to his warnings, Glasgow eventually gave up
on acting proactively: "After a week of not a response, I figured this was really
happening, now there was nothing I could do to stop the plant from operation…I said
my peace, to no avail, to many different entities and left it at that and tried to focus on
getting the plant ready to run" (Fleming, L., 2018, Feb. 24). Glasgow assumed that the
plant would have to use corrosion control chemicals, which would have required a sixmonth delay to preparing the plant, but DEQ representatives told him that the
chemicals were not needed (Oosting, J., 2016, March 30), so the water switch occurred
and corrosion control chemicals were not added to the water from the polluted river.
In early May, just days after the switch occurred, Flint residents began to
complain about the water’s odor, taste and appearance. One of those complaints
reached the desk of Jennifer Crooks, the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA)
Michigan program manager at the Ground Water and Drinking Water Branch (GWDW).
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On May 15, she emailed her colleagues to convey information she had received from
Flint resident Lathan Jefferson: “…[H]is doctor says the rash is from the new drinking
water…He has no interest in speaking with Mike Prisby; he doesn’t trust anyone in MI
government” (FWATF Timeline, p. 6).

LeeAnne Walters—Lead Epicenter
In August 2014 test results showed that fecal coliform bacteria levels were high
enough to signal a contamination of the drinking water system (Ridley, G., 2016, Feb.
14). Flint increased the water chlorine levels and, on August 15, issued a boil water
advisory (Fleming, L., 2018, Feb. 24) . Meanwhile a Flint mother of four began noticing
worrisome health problems within her family. Initially, Lee-Ann Walters’s husband and
kids developed skin rashes and hair loss. Next, her teenage son missed three weeks of
school because he was experiencing nausea, dizziness, and overall pain. Then one of her
twin toddlers lagged the other in weight and “developed a bright red rash with scaly
patches on his body after bathing” (Kozlowski, K. 2016, Jan. 25).
According to Michael Glasgow, he contacted MDEQ’s Mike Prysby to discuss the
boil water advisory. In an email to a supervisor, Glasgow shared that Prysby had given
him an “off the record” suggestion: The city could flush fire hydrants near disinfection
byproduct testing sites (Fonger, R. 2018, Feb 27). The elevated bacteria levels continued
to be a problem into the next month. On Sept. 5, the city issued a second boil water
notice and again boosted its chlorine application. Even after a second water quality alert
had been issued in as many months, no one from MDEQ came by to inspect the water
plant (Fleming, L., 2018, Feb. 24).

GM Quit
The effects of Flint’s money-saving attempt were not limited to its human
customers. The following month, on Oct. 13, 2015, GM announced that the water was
corroding car parts and it therefore would be leaving the City of Flint’s water system and
instead would be drawing its water from Flint Township, which was still on Detroit’s
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system. Losing GM meant an annual loss of $400,000 for the city (Livengood, C., 2016,
Feb. 26).
The following day, an aide to Michigan Senate Minority Leader Jim Ananich, a
Flint Democrat, sent an article about the car maker’s announcement to Valerie Brader,
Gov. Snyder’s environmental policy adviser. Brader forwarded the article to MDEQ
Director Dan Wyant and two others, writing, “This underscores the need for the folks
form DEQ to talk to the EM in Flint and to make sure a blended water solution is being
explored” (Livengood, C., 2016, Feb. 26 ). Additionally, Brader shared the article with
Chief Legal Counsel Mike Gandola, Chief of Staff Dennis Muchmore, Deputy Chief of
Staff Beth Clement and Communications Director Jarrod Agen. Her message to
governor’s office colleagues stated that the Flint water matter had to be fixed urgently.
She indicated that she had purposely omitted MDEQ from the email thread to protect
the exchange from the state’s Freedom of Information Act. Gadola, whose mother was a
Flint resident, replied to Brader’s email:
To anyone who grew up in Flint as I did, the notion that I would be getting my
drinking water from the Flint River is downright scary […] Too bad the
(emergency manager) didn’t ask me what I thought, though I’m sure he heard it
from plenty of others […] Nice to know [my mother]’s drinking water with
elevated chlorine levels and fecal coliform […] I agree with Valerie. They should
try to get back on the Detroit system as a stopgap ASAP before this thing gets
too far out of control (Livengood, C., 2016, Feb. 26).
According to Dennis Muchmore, Brader and Gadola’s advocacy suggesting for
Flint to abandon the river water and return to Detroit until the KWA pipeline could be
completed was the predominant sentiment within the governor’s office. In the end,
however, “[t]reasury Department officials concluded the cost to reconnect Flint to
Detroit water—an extra $1 million per month—was deemed more than the caststrapped city of Flint could afford” (Livengood, C., 2016, Feb. 26).
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Legionella and the Water
Legionella bacteria can be found in freshwater and manmade water systems
(Bouffard, K. 2017, Aug. 5). In the latter, the microorganisms become problematic for
public health when they are spread through mist or vapor that is then inhaled by
humans. With symptoms that are similar to pneumonia, Legionellosis, or illness from
legionella, results most often during warm weather. The illness is not contagious from
person to person, but people with weakened immune systems or lung problems are at a
higher risk of contracting Legionnaires’ disease, a life-threatening illness.
From 2010 to 2013, the number of Legionnaires’ disease cases reported in
Genesee County during the month of August were zero, three, four and two
respectively. In August 2014, there were ten cases reported in the county (Thierry
2016).
Shannon Johnson, an infectious disease epidemiologist with Michigan’s
Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS), reached out to her colleagues on
Oct. 13 about the increase in Legionnaires’ disease cases. She shared that although
Genesee County health officials were milling the idea that the legionellosis spike had
something to do with Flint’s McLaren Regional Medical Center, she and a colleague
were not convinced that it was limited to the hospital (Gerstein and Fleming 2017, June
20). Johnson shared that she had let the county health department know they could rely
on environmental testing by way of MDHHS or DEQ laboratories (Bouffard, K., 2016,
Feb. 24). As none of the surrounding counties had comparable illness increases during
the previous five years, Johnson hypothesized “that the source of the outbreak may be
the Flint municipal water” (Lynch, J. 2016, Feb. 10).
During an Oct. 17, 2014 conference call between officials representing Genesee
County’s Health Department and Flint’s Drinking Water Program, they discuss the
county’s concern about the 2014 Legionnaires’ disease outbreak and agreed to
cooperate as the county explored the possibility that the bacterial load growth could be
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related to the water system changes that had occurred since the April 2014 water
switch to using the Flint River (Longley 2012).
Susan Bohm, manager of the MDHHS’s respiratory illnesses epidemiology unit
emailed colleagues Shannon Johnson, Jay Fielder, and Jim Collins to describe the
telephone conversation that she had with Liane Shekter Smith, director of MDEQ’s
Office of Drinking Water and Municipal Assistance (DWMA). During the call, Shekter
Smith expressed worry that there would be a public proclamation made that directly
linked the water to the illnesses. Bohm responded that water from Flint was, at that
point, “just a hypothesis" (Lynch, J. 2016, Feb. 10 ; Gerstein and Fleming 2017, June 20 )
and shared that Shekter Smith had asked if the county had “the capability to test
water,” to which she was told that MDHHS “would be working with Genesee to
coordinate any water testing" (Gerstein and Fleming, 2017, June 20 ). The concluding
portion of the email was bold facing:
What she did share with me was interesting – that there have been numerous
complaints about the Flint water, that the Governor's Office had been involved,
and that any announcement by public health about the quality of the water
would certainly inflame the situation (Gerstein and Fleming 2017, June 20 ).
Jim Henry, Environmental Health Supervisor for Genesee County, participated in
the Oct. 17 conference call with Flint’s Drinking Water Program. Although he believed
that the two government agencies would have a positive working collaboration as they
investigated the water system’s connection to the Legionnaires’ disease outbreak, he
was surprised when, starting in November 2014, his written and verbal requests for
information went unanswered (Dolan et al., 2016, Feb 9).

Anger Rising
The new calendar year did not provide Flint residents and government officials
with a break from its water woes. By the second day of 2015 the City of Flint warned
residents that the water had a high level of total trihalomethanes (TTHM), a disinfection
byproduct. According to the notice, Flint’s water could be used for drinking, but those
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populations whose health was at higher risk should seek advice from their health care
providers (Ridley, G., 2016, Feb. 14). In addition to cancer, people who have long-term
exposure to excess TTHMs can develop liver, kidney, or central nervous system
problems (Ridley, G., 2016, Feb. 14). Information about the uptick in Legionnaires’
disease cases in Genesee County would ultimately not be shared until a year later, but,
according to a state official, starting in January 2015, discussing information about the
Legionnaires’ outbreak and its possible ties to the water switch carried “political
overtones” (Fonger, R. 2017, Oct. 8).
A group of protesters gathered outside City Hall to draw attention to the water’s
quality problems and increasing water bills on Jan. 13, the second Tuesday of the year
(Nagl, K., 2015, Jan. 14). Later that day, City Councilman Eric Mays hosted a meeting in
which residents voiced aggravating water stories with a panel of council members, the
city mayor, Howard Croft, the city’s director of infrastructure and development, and
state representative Sheldon Neeley. LeeAnne Walters attended that meeting and
shared that her 3-year-old, who had a compromised immune system, was experiencing
skin rashes after his bath (Nagl, K., 2015, Jan. 14). The city held another town hall
meeting the following week. Stephen Busch and Michael Prysby of MDEQ, along with
Flint’s Howard Croft, were supposed to answer residents’ questions, but the Jan. 21
gathering was shut down after it was filled with angry residents (Fonger, R. 2019, June
27).

Intra-institution Conversations on Legionella
Several state institutional actors discussed the topic of Legionnaires’ disease
among each other in early 2015. Corrine Miller, the state epidemiologist, learned that
there had been a about the 2014 spike in Legionnaires’ cases in Genesee County from
her staff on Jan. 23, 2015. Miller shared her concerns with her boss, Sue Moran (GoodinSmith, O. 2017, Sept. 26). A few days later, Genesee County’s Jim Henry emailed
colleagues describing his roadblocks in exploring the intersection of the water switch
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and the Legionnaires’ disease outbreak (Dolan et al., 2016, Feb 9). In the email Henry
alleged that DEQ’s Mike Prysby and Steve Busch refused to meet with his office
(Livengood and Bouffard, 2016, Feb. 12) . Henry submitted a FOIA request with the City
of Flint on Jan. 27, 2015 (Ridley, G., 2016, March 6).
January 28, 2015 was a big day for email intra-institution discussions about
Legionnaires’ disease. At MDHHS, Jim Collins, director of the communicable disease
division, informed the former state epidemiologist (Dr. Matthew Davis) the chief deputy
director (Tim Becker), the deputy director (Susan Moran), and Corrine Miller of the
bureaucratic difficulties that the county was experiencing, for "some elevated levels of
legionella infection that seemed, anecdotally at least, to coincide with the [changeover]
in Flint water" (Livengood, C., 2016, June 27). Additionally, Collins detailed how
problems of high chlorination could, in addition to posing a risk from high TTHM levels,
facilitate a dangerous bacterial growth:
It also seems that all of the abandoned properties in Flint may have “dead end”
water lines that are challenging to treat or flush and may contribute to
downstream contamination…I'm sure that the DEQ is investigating all of this and
we'd be interested to hear of their findings to date (Livengood, C., 2016, June
27).
Susan Moran, MDHHS deputy director, replied to Collins’s email with concern,
copied Corrine Miller and asked, "At this point, would you typically share info about # of
Legionellosis cases with DEQ?," to which Collins replied, "We've had contact with DEQ
staff and have let them know that this is going on" (Livengood, C., 2016, June 27).
On the same day, Corrine Miller met with MDHHS Director Nick Lyon to inform
him of the 2014 outbreak. Lyon, who had been appointed to his position by Gov. Snyder,
asked her for a report that would summarize the problem (Livengood and Oosting,
2016). In addition to meeting with Nick Lyon, Miller met with Linda Dykema. Miller
shared her opinion that because the water switch occurred when Darnell Earley was in
charge of Flint and Gov. Snyder had appointed Earley, news of a disease linked with the
water could look bad for Snyder. Although the state agency could have issued a warning
to residents, they delayed informing Flint the public to allow for more time to find the
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source of the problem (Goodin-Smith, O. 2017, Sept. 26 ). In addition to Miller, Dykema
alerted 13 other department officials, informing them how any public inquiries on the
topic should be handled: “Sharing this information to make you aware that there is a
political situation that we don't want to stumble into should we get hotline calls […]
Refer callers to me if you take any, please” (Gerstein and Fleming 2017).
On the last Friday of the month, Suzanne Cupal, director of the public health
division at the Genesee County crossed institutional lines by reaching out to Nick Lyon
and others at the state and county health departments. Cupal’s email, dated Jan. 30, in
part said that her department had specifically requested MDHHS’s help from an expert
in “type 1 water supplies and communicable disease” (Goodin-Smith, O. 2017, Nov. 5),
and she had not yet heard from the state agency. She also asked to discuss parameters
for designating the situation an outbreak (Lynch, J. 2016, Feb.10 ). That same day, Brad
Wurfel, director of communications for MDEQ, sent an event planning email to the
governor’s deputy press secretary regarding a $2 million grant that was supposed to
contribute to Flint’s water system upgrade to KWA. Wurfel specifically did not want his
boss, MDEQ Director Dan Wyant, publicly describing the water as safe (Fonger, R., 2016,
Feb. 28) until more information was known about the legionellosis cases. He offered
more detailed discussions on the subject could occur by telephone or in-person
meetings (Oosting, J., 2016, Feb. 26).

Cross-Institution Confusion on Corrosion Control
The Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 1991 lead and copper rule set the
actionable threshold to more than 15 parts per billion (ppb) in 10 percent of samples.
This meant that a water system could be required to make changes like removing lead
service lines or enacting corrosion control measures. According to Michael Glasgow,
MDEQ guided him to not add corrosion control chemicals to the water right away,
instead he was told to first conduct two six-month monitoring periods (Ridley, G. 2016,
March 29) to determine if any corrosion control chemicals were needed. According to
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state records, during the last six months of 2014, there were 100 water samples
collected in Flint. Of those, two sites had lead readings that were above 15 ppb and 10
percent of homes had more than 5 ppb (Fonger, R. 2015, Sept. 20). Mike Glasgow
trusted MDEQ’s guidance and figured MDEQ would let him know if anything needed
to change (Oosting, J., 2016, March 30). The second monitoring period began in January
2015 (Fonger, R. 2015, Sept. 20).
According to LeeAnne Walters, she approached Jerry Ambrose at a January 2015
Town Hall, and he doubted that the two water bottles that she showed him, one filled
with a yellow liquid and another filled with a dark brown liquid, were real samples
collected from her home (Clark, A. 2018, July 15). On Feb. 4, 2015, Ms. Walters showed
city officials a video of the rashes that her son’s skin developed throughout his body
after being bathed (Del Toral 2015). Walters did not have any follow-up from the city
until she submitted a doctor’s note from her son’s pediatrician documenting the 3-yearold’s weakened immune system and calling attention to the effects the water seemed to
be having on him. On Wednesday, Feb. 11, Michael Glasgow inspected the plumbing at
the Walters home and collected water samples. A few days later he delivered results
that indicated high iron levels, which led him to request additional testing for lead and
copper (Clark, A. 2018, July 15).
The second test results, released on Feb. 18 (Ridley, G., ND), indicated that lead
levels at the Walters home were 104 ppb (Clark, A. 2018, July 15). Glasgow called
Walters—his voice sounding agitated—and told her to not drink the water (Oosting, J.,
2016, March 30). The following day Walters met with Glasgow at his office, where he
showed her the lab report, which had the MDEQ logo on it (Clark, A. 2018, July 15).
Walters’s next step was to contact the EPA’s regional office. Miguel Del Toral answered
her phone call on Feb. 25 (Del Toral 2015). When she shared her home’s test results Del
Toral’s initial thought was that there had to be some sort of misunderstanding, but after
“getting to know how quickly she was picking things up and the information she was
providing was accurate,” he decided to investigate (Smith, L. 2016, Jan 21).
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The following day, Jennifer Crooks, Miguel Del Toral’s superior at EPA, sent
MDEQ’s Stephen Busch an email in which she supposed “the different chemistry water
is leaching out contaminants from the insides of the biofilms inside the pipes” (Fonger,
R., 2016, Feb. 28) and specified that the Flint service lines were required to have
“Optimal Corrosion Control Treatment” (OCCT) in the water system (Howes, D. 2016,
Feb. 13). Miguel Del Toral inquired about OCCT in Flint’s water on Feb. 27 (Lynch and
Oosting 2016). Stephen Busch responded by stating that the city had an optimized
corrosion control program (Lynch and Oosting 2016), but was not specific about the
treatment details (Clark, A. 2018, July 15).
After responding to Del Toral Busch also reached out to his superiors Liane
Shekter Smith and Richard Benzie, field operations section chief for MDEQ. Busch wrote,
“As indicated by Mike and Adam the city is meeting 90th percentile. Not sure why region
5 [EPA] sees this one sample as such a big deal” (Walters et. al v. Snyder et al 2017).
Patrick Cook, an engineer with MDEQ’s Community Drinking Water Unit (CDWU)
responded to Crook and Del Toral’s evaluation by describing MDEQ’s incorrect
understanding of the lead and copper rule: “If it is determined that Flint has to install
corrosion control treatment, the rule allows up to two years to complete a study and an
additional two years to install the treatment unless we set a shorter time” (Howes, D.
2016, Feb. 13).
In addition to being contacted by LeeAnne Waters about water quality concerns
in her home in February 2015, the EPA was contacted by at least one more person in
Genesee County: An official with the Genesee County’s health department contacted
the EPA and shared information about the spike in Legionnaires’ disease cases over the
previous year. This prompted an official with the EPA to reach out to the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Due to the seriousness of the situation the CDC
proposed further assistance in the form of epidemiologic and laboratory support from
its Atlanta headquarters or in Michigan, but Michigan health officials turned down the
offer (Livengood and Bouffard, 2016, Feb. 12; Fonger, R., 2016, Feb. 16).
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Contentious Colloquies
Dialogue about water-related illnesses across institutions was highly contentious
in March 2015. First, in a voicemail message to Miguel Del Toral, Stephen Bush implied
that lead problems at the Walters home were a result of the structure’s indoor
plumbing, which would mean that the homeowner was the responsible party (Del Toral
2015). Next, a March 10 email originating from Genesee County on Legionnaires’
disease produced a range of contentious conversations. Jim Henry emailed Flint’s Jerry
Ambrose, City Administrator Natasha Henderson, and four other city officials. Henry
made the following statement about Legionella in Flint:
In 2014, Genesee County experienced a significant increase of confirmed
Legionella illnesses relative to the previous years. Legionella can be a deadly,
waterborne disease that typically affects the respiratory system…The increase of
the illnesses closely corresponds with the time frame of the switch to the Flint
River water. The majority of cases reside or have an association with the city.
Also, McLaren Hospital identified and mitigated Legionella in their water
system…This is rather glaring information, and it needs to be looked into now,
prior to the warmer summer months when Legionella is at its peak and we are
potentially faced with a crisis (Fonger, R., 2016 Feb. 11).
The following day, MDEQ’s Richard Benzie wrote to MDEQ officials including
Mike Prysby, Liane Shekter Smith, and Stephen Busch. Benzie’s email included an action
plan for addressing the Legionnaires’ outbreak that included informing DEQ
management, reaching out to the CDC, and learning what information the other
government agencies had about the outbreak (Livengood, C., 2016, March 19). After
sending the action plan to his colleagues at MDEQ, Benzie also forwarded the
information to two officials at the EPA, Jennifer Crooks, Chicago-based program
manager for Michigan, and Thomas Poy. Benzie asked EPA to keep the information
private because he did not know how an official announcement was going to be made,
but he wanted to give them “a heads up that another problem could become public
soon" (Livengood, C., 2016, March 19).
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Liane Shekter Smith wrote that Stephen Busch rejected Henry’s claim that
anyone at MDEQ avoided meeting with Genesee County (Livengood and Bouffard, 2016,
Feb. 12). The following day, Friday, March 13, 2015, Jim Henry sent a detailed email to
Flint and MDEQ officials in which he outlined the obstacles he experienced in
attempting to investigate the Legionnaires’ disease outbreak. He pled with all
governmental institution stakeholders for collaboration on the issue (Ridley, G., 2016,
March 6):


There was a substantial growth in the number of illnesses and the risks of
increased disinfection byproducts “pale in comparison” (Ridley, G., 2016, March
6) to the potential damage to public health from legionella.



The timeframe for the illness increases had an association with city’s water
switch. As McLaren Hospital had “identified and mitigated” a Legionella problem
in their system, this was “rather glaring information” that was time-sensitive,
needing to be investigated “prior to the warmer summer months when
Legionella [would be] at its peak and [they would be] potentially faced with a
crisis” (Bouffard, K., 2016, Feb. 24).

MDEQ’s Stephen Busch replied to Henry’s email. Busch specified that the FOIA
request was not aimed at MDEQ and questioned the legitimacy of Jim Henry’s
assessment:
Your email below claims that you have explicitly explained the situation to our
Department…However, since contacting our office early last October to indicate
a rise in cases, we have not received any further information regarding your
epidemiological investigation into this matter (Ridley, G., 2016, March 6).
Conclusions that Legionella is coming from the public water system without the
presentation of any substantiating evidence from your epidemiologic
investigation appears premature and prejudice(d) toward that end (Bouffard, K.,
2016, Feb. 24).
Brad Wurfel of MDEQ forwarded Busch’s response to various staff members at
the governor’s office, including Snyder aide Harvey Hollins (Bouffard, K., 2016, Feb. 24),
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press officers Sara Wurfel (Brad Wurfel’s wife), Dave Murray (Ridley, G., 2016, March 6),
and Jarrod Agen (Oosting, J., 2016, Feb. 26). Wurfel alleged that Henry’s email was an
excuse for the county’s failure to properly investigate a Legionnaire's outbreak (Ridley,
G., 2016, March 6) and placed distrust on the notion that a Legionnaires' disease
increase had a relation to the water switch:
(Henry)'s made the leap formally in his email that the uptick in cases is directly
attributable to the river as a drinking water source – this is beyond
irresponsible, given that his department has failed to do the necessary
traceback work to provide any conclusive of where the outbreak is sources,
and it also flies in the face of the very thing a drinking water system is
designed to do (Lynch, J. 2016, Feb. 5)... Legionnaires is NOT among the 90
water contaminants screened in the Safe Drinking Water Act, but in the
absence of action by county health, our staff are now considering taking
samples from various points in the system and working with (the health
department's) lab to test for it, if for no other reason than to rule it out
(Bouffard, K., 2016, Feb. 24).
Although Stephen Busch’s email response to Genesee County’ called alleged
some bias on Henry’s Legionellosis investigation, a few days later, on March 17, he
reached out to the Flint City Officials Gerald Ambrose, Howard Croft, Natasha
Henderson, Brent Wright, Daugherty Johnson and MDEQ’s Mike Prisby. In the email,
Busch included facts and figures related to protecting residential plumbing systems from
a Legionnaires' disease outbreak (Livengood and Lynch 2016).
It had been XX since the water switch and XX since GM had determined that
Flint’s new water was not good enough for car parts. In March 2015 the Flint City
Council approved a resolution to reconnect to the DWSD (Fonger 2015, March 24). The
7-1 vote was symbolic because Jerry Ambrose was still in control of the city’s finances
(Oosting, J. 2016, March 3). The following day, Ambrose issued a statement in which he
referred to the Council’s vote as “incomprehensible” given the $12 million annual cost
that returning to Detroit’s water service so would entail (Fonger, R., 2015, March 24).
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EPA’s March 26 Conference Call
On March 26, officials from EPA’s Midwest region participated in a conference
call in which they discussed Flint’s water quality problems. Those participating in the call
included Jennifer Crooks, Miguel Del Toral, Darren Lytle, a Legionella specialist in the
Cincinnati office, and EPA Region 5 Ground and Drinking Water Branch Chief Thomas
Poy (Livengood and Bouffard, 2016, Feb. 12). Jennifer Crooks shared her conference call
notes with MDEQ’s Stephen Busch and Mike Prysby (Livengood and Bouffard, 2016, Feb.
12). According to Crook’s email, the state and federal officials knew that there were
TTHM violations as well as the possibility that increasing lead levels would pose a
problem (Fonger, R., 2016 Feb. 16):


Darren Lytle held that even in the case that increased levels of Legionella were not
materializing in people’s homes, the bacteria were proliferating somewhere in the
distribution system. He said that the source must be found, for if the microbes were
“present, in the tanks/pipes then disturbance of changing the water quality and
flushing could cause it to proliferate" (Bouffard, K., 2016, Feb. 24).



Miguel Del Toral conjectured that the flushing of fire hydrants could be agitating
sediments in the pipes, requiring more chlorine and creating an environment that
was hospitable to Legionella (Fonger, R., 2016 Feb. 16).



Tony Poy said his team was making preparations for when the state made the
Legionella announcement (Livengood and Bouffard, 2016, Feb. 12).
EPA’s Miguel Del Toral been told by MDEQ that Flint’s water had a corrosion

control treatment program, but he had evidence that showed that corrosion control
chemicals had not been added to the Flint water system. On April 23 Del Toral contacted
MDEQ’s Patrick Cook asking, again, if the Flint Water Plant was using corrosion control.
The following day Patrick Cook confirmed that the water plant was not using corrosion
control chemicals (NRDC and ACLU 2015). Del Toral replied to Patrick Cook on Saturday,
April 25 to present his concern that the lack of corrosion control treatment combined
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with pre flushing of fire hydrants were causing a system-wide public health problem.
Additionally, Del Toral explained that based on his interpretation of the Lead and
Copper rule Flint did not met eligibility for the rule’s exception for adding corrosion
control treatments only if deemed necessary at the conclusion of two consecutive sixmonth testing periods (Anderson et al v. Wyant et al, 2018, Feb. 22).
The following Monday Miguel Del Toral visited the Walters home, inspected the
plumbing and found that it was mostly plastic (Del Toral 2015). As it turns out, the
Walters family had the plumbing replaced when they moved into the home in 2011. This
meant that the March voicemail from MDEQ’s Stephen Busch alluding to the lead
results in the Walters home being a problem related to the home itself was an
erroneous claim (Clark, A. 2018, July 15). Meanwhile, Stephen Busch and other DEQ
officials wrote emails indicating they did not welcome Del Toral's continued questioning
of their methods: Busch wrote, “If he continues to persist, we may need Liane or
Director Wyant to make a call to EPA to help address his over-reaches" (Lynch and
Oosting 2016). Cook responded, “I agree, the constant second guessing of how we
interpret and implement our rules is getting tiresome” (Bridge Michigan 2016).

Institutional Deception
At the individual level, Robert Skidmore’s illness and eventual death was the
epicenter of the Flint Water Crisis’s Legionnaires’ disease scandal. Before 2015, GM
Retiree Robert J. Skidmore, would go to Flint’s McLaren hospital every so often to have
fluid drawn from his lungs due to a heart condition. According to Robert Skidmore Jr.,
the elder Skidmore was generally active despite his heart condition but became
noticeably ill after his May 2015 visit to the hospital (Fonger, R. 2018, Jan. 30). Robert
Skidmore was admitted to McLaren-Flint hospital with symptoms that resembled
pneumonia on June 1, 2015 (Goodin-Smith, O., 2017, June 18). The following day a
physician collected a sample from Skidmore that was positive for Legionnaires’ disease
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(and would later match a sample taken from a victim at Hurley Medical Center) (Fleming
and Oosting 2017).
On June 4 (three days after Skidmore was admitted to McLaren Flint) MDHHS
Communicable Disease Division Director Jim Collins sent a report that detailed 45
Legionnaires’ disease cases that occurred in Genesee County from June 6, 2014 through
March 9, 2015. Collins declared the outbreak to be “over” (Livengood and Bouffard,
2016, Feb. 12). Collins’ report was sent to Jim Henry and other county officials. In his
message, Collins asserted that any assistance requests to the CDC had to come from the
state health agency—not the county (Livengood and Bouffard, 2016, Feb. 12). Jim Henry
forwarded the Collins email and expressed doubt that the outbreak was no longer a
threat:
The executive summary regarding the Legionella outbreak is appreciated, but I
don't know if there is consensus that it is over...There has been a lot of finger
pointing and miscommunications, which continues even in the email below from
Jim Collins, today. I think us reaching out to CDC and EPA was appropriate. We
were not gaining much ground with the state agencies and now the warmer
weather is upon us (Livengood and Bouffard, 2016, Feb. 12).
After he visited her home, Miguel Del Toral connected LeeAnne Walters with
Marc Edwards, a Virginia Tech researcher known for helping expose a lead problem in
Washington, D.C.’s water system in 2004. Even though Edwards knew that the city and
state agencies had tested the water in Walters’s home, he wanted to ensure that the
analyses had not been manipulated and took it upon himself to have the home’s water
in a controlled environment in his own laboratory. The samples revealed levels at a.)
300, b.) 2,000 and c.) 13,000 ppb. According to the EPA, water with 5,000 ppb is deemed
to be toxic waste. Edwards shared with Walters and Del Toral that those results were
the worst contamination of lead that he had seen in more than a quarter of a century
(Clark, A. 2018, July 15).
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Del Toral’s Memo
Miguel Del Toral asked LeeAnne Walters for permission to describe her ordeal to
his colleagues at EPA (Lynch, J., 2016, March 29). He drafted a memo dated June 24,
2015 in which he delineated the health threats that Flint’s water system problems could
mean for the community (Lynch, J., 2016, March 29). The report addressed
Groundwater and Drinking Water Branch Head in Chicago Tom Poy, two EPA water
experts, and Marc Edwards. The report also copied four MDEQ officials.
EPA protocol called for reports that make such allegations to be verified and
approved by the agency before a final version could be released. As the danger
increased with the passage of time, Del Toral sent hard copies to the MDEQ agents who
were involved with Flint and when Walters asked for a copy, he did not make her wait
for the vetted version. Walters shared the preliminary report with a reporter whom she
trusted (Clark, A. 2018, July 15).
The report apparently created some conflict Del Toral, for the following day he
described in detail his frustration with the institutional hurdles he faced in not just doing
his job, but protecting unsuspecting people at risk. In response to questions from Rita
Bair, an official with EPA’s Region V division, Del Toral summarized his impression that
Flint officials were artificially lowering lead levels in collusion with MDEQ to conceal a
problem and wrote the following:
Sorry for the rant, but I am really getting tired of the bad actors being ignored,
and people trying to do the right thing are constantly being subjected to intense
scrutiny as if we were doing something wrong. I truly, truly hate working here.
EPA is a cesspool. It's all of this “don't find anything bad” crap at EPA that is
reason I desperately want to leave. I am not happy to find bad things. It is
completely stressful because it means children are being damaged and I have to
put up with all of the political crap, but where these problems exist, I will not
ignore them. I understand that this is not a comfortable situation, but the State
is complicit in this and the public has a right to know what they are doing
because it is their children that are being harmed. At a MINIMUM, the city
should be warning residents about the high lead, not hiding it telling them there
is no lead in the water. The widespread high lead is my judgment based on a
couple of decades of working with lead issues and I stand by it despite the
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limited data set from Flint. They have had no corrosion control treatment in
place for over a year now and they have lead service lines. It's just basic
chemistry on lead solubility. You will have high lead leaching into the water
where you are doing nothing to mitigate that. We don't need to drop a bowling
ball off every building in every town to know that it will fall to the ground in all of
these places. If there truly is a question in anyone's mind that there is a
widespread lead problem in Flint, despite the painfully clear science, I am
requesting that I be provided two assistants and that you folks allow me to go
and sample 100 homes in Flint without pre-flushing and then we can satisfy any
doubts that anyone may have. I am not even asking for per diem and I'll pay my
own hotel (Lynch, J., 2016, March 29).
The information that Del Toral’s memo revealed had many possible implications
for the health of many citizens along with the institutions that had failures. In July 2015,
Dennis Muchmore, the governor’s chief of staff, heard that church pastors in Flint were
worried about lead levels in the water. When Muchmore followed up with state
officials, he was told that blood lead levels were not a source of alarm (Fonger, R., 2016,
Feb. 28). EPA Region V Administrator Susan Hedman reached out to Mayor Walling to
inform him of EPA’s support of MDEQ as they addressed water issues and, on the Del
Toral memo, said “it would be premature to draw any conclusions”(Burke, M.N., 2016,
Feb. 26) and it "should not have been released outside the agency" (Lynch, J., 2016,
March 29). The memo was kept internally for four months after that (Burke, M.N., 2016,
Feb. 26).

Lead Story Breaks
Curt Guyette, was hired to serve as an investigative reporter for the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Michigan. Even though he worked for a nonprofit
organization instead of a traditional news outlet, Guyette followed journalism etiquette
and on July 7 contacted MDEQ’s media relations department. After the call, DEQ’s Karen
Tommasulo summarized her conversation with Guyette in an email to Brad Wurfel:
I got a weird call from a “reporter” with the ACLU asking about Flint drinking
water. His Name is Curt Guyette. He said he heard from someone at EPA that we
use a “flawed methodology” to collect our water samples. We apparently tell
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people to flush the water from their pipes, let it sit overnight, and then take the
sample in the morning. He claims this doesn’t measure what’s in the main pipes,
only in the pipes leading directly to their house. Consequently, he claims, we
vastly underestimate lead. Apparently the EPA and Virginia Tech sampled a
house using a different methodology and found 13,000 ppb lead. Additionally, he
claimed Flint is not adding corrosion control to their water, and said a city of
their size should be doing so by law. But apparently we told Flint they didn’t
have to. I didn’t offer any comment, just took the message from him (Bridge
Michigan, 2016, March 1).
The ACLU of Michigan broke the story based on Del Toral’s memo on July 9, 2015
(Guyette 2015). After she got an interview request from Michigan Public Radio,
Tommasulo emailed Brad Wurfel saying, “Apparently, it is going to be a thing now”
(Osnos, E. 2016, Jan. 20). Brad Wurfel served as MDEQ spokesperson for the Michigan
Public Radio interview that aired on July 13, in which he said, “Let me start here—
anyone who is concerned about lead in the drinking water in Flint can relax…It does not
look like there is any broad problem with the water supply freeing up lead as it goes to
homes” (Smith, L. 2015, July 13).
After the ACLU’s lead story broke, LeeAnne Walters said that she got a peculiar
call from Miguel Del Toral: “He was telling me that he couldn't talk to me anymore…He
said he couldn't talk to anybody from Flint or about Flint" (Lynch, J., 2016, March 29).
According to EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy, EPA got evidence that there was a
systemic lead problem on July 21. Before then, Del Toral’s hypothesis was based on
observations from three properties alone (Lynch, J., 2016, March 29)
The following day, July 22, 2015, Dennis Muchmore, chief of staff for the
governor, sent an email to MDHHS Director Nick Lyon in which he described his
irritation with the situation:
I'm frustrated by the water issue in Flint. I really don't think people are getting
the benefit of the doubt. Now they are concerned and rightfully so about the
lead level studies they are receiving from the DEQ samples…These folks are
scared and worried about the health impacts and they are basically getting
blown off by us (as a state we're just not sympathizing with their plight) (Demas,
S.J. 2016, Jan. 12).
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Additionally, Linda Dykema, director of MDHHS’s Division of Environmental
Health, prepped her managers with how to answer public inquiries about Del Toral’s
memo:
DEQ has not seen a change in the city’s compliance with the lead rule since
switching to the Flint River source…Regarding the EPA drinking water official
quoted in the press articles, the report that he issued was a result of his own
research and was not reviewed or approved by EPA management. He has
essentially acted outside his authority (Anderson et al v. Wyant et al, 2018, Feb.
22, p. 10).
On Sunday, Aug. 23, Virginia Tech’s Marc Edwards informed MDEQ that he was
going to conduct a water quality study in Flint (Snyder RICO Lawsuit 2016, April 6, p. 51).
Before the following weekend, MDEQ’s Brad Wurfel accused Del Toral, the ACLU and
activists of distorting the truth:
This person is the one who had EPA lead specialist come to her home and do
tests, then released an unvetted draft of his report (that EPA apologized to us
profusely for) to the resident, who shared it with ACLU, who promptly used it to
continue raising hell with the locals… [I]t’s been rough sledding with a steady
parade of community groups keeping everyone hopped-up and misinformed”
(Snyder RICO Lawsuit, 2016, April 6, pp 51-52).
Toward the end of August, Virginia Tech’s preliminary findings based on 120
initial samples were made available; the results showed that 42 percent of the samples
were greater than 5 ppb and 20 percent exceeded the EPA’s lead action limit of 15 ppb
(Fonger, R. 2015, Sept. 2). Shortly thereafter Mike Glasgow and Flint’s Director of Public
Works Howard Croft had an in-person conversation with at least one MDEQ official.
During this in-person meeting, an MDEQ official referred to the city’s corrosion controls
as being “not optimized” and needing phosphates. Mike Glasgow sent Howard Croft an
email on Aug. 31 that provided background information on the DEQ assertion: "We
originally had this chemical in the design, but the DEQ did not mandate it from the start,
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they informed us to wait and see the results of our lead and copper sampling to
determine if it was necessary” (Ridley, G. 2016, March 11) .
Virginia Tech’s Marc Edwards released his findings based on water collected
from 300 Flint homes on Sept. 2, 2015. The report concluded the “very corrosive”
drinking water was “causing lead contamination in homes” (Fonger, R. 2015, Sept. 2).
That same day MDEQ issued a press release in response to the Virginia Tech report:
[W]e want to be very clear that the lead levels being detected in Flint drinking
water are not coming from the treatment plant or the city’s transmission lines…
The issue is how, or whether, and to what extent the drinking water is
interacting with lead plumbing in people’s homes….the results reported so far
fail to track with any of the lead sampling conducted by the city. In addition,
Virginia Tech results are not reflected by the blood lead level testing regularly
conducted by the state department of community health that have not shown
any change since Flint switched sources (Snyder RICO Lawsuit, 2016, April 6, p.
52).
The following day Howard Croft informed city and state officials that the city was
again compliant with the Safe Drinking Water Act (Ridley, G., 2016, Feb. 14; Lynch, J.
2016, Feb. 10). Additionally, he provided an explanation for the decision to opt for
testing instead of adding corrosion control preemptively:
Most chemicals used in this process are phosphate-based and phosphate can be
a “food” for bacteria…At the onset of our plant design, optimization for lead was
addressed and discussed with the engineering firm and with the (Michigan
Department of Environmental Quality)…It was determined that having more
data was advisable to the commitment of a specific optimization method (Lynch,
J. 2016, Feb. 10).
On Sept. 6, 2015, Michigan Public Radio published a story on the Virginia Tech
report. Brad Wurfel spoke on behalf of MDEQ and said, “The samples don’t match the
testing that we’ve been doing in the same kind of neighborhoods all over the city for the
past year. With these kinds of numbers, we would have expected to be seeing a spike
somewhere else in the other lead monitoring that goes on in the community” (Carmody,
S. 2015, Sept. 6).
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Marc Edwards and his research team won a National Science Foundation (NSF)
grant to study the effects of interruptions in corrosion control treatments in water
systems, which was announced on Sept. 10, 2015 (Bouffard, K. 2016 Jan. 23). The
following day, Sept. 11, 2015, Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha, a pediatrician at Hurley Medical
Center, contacted Pediatrician Lawrence Reynolds of Mott Children's Health Center to
share concerns about how the revelations demonstrated in the Virginia Tech report
could be affecting the community’s children. She gathered a medical research team
while Dr. Reynolds contacted MDHH’s Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Program
(CLPPP) to request Flint data.
Meanwhile, Jennifer Crooks, Michigan Program Manager for the EPA, sent an
email from a personal account dated Sept. 11 to MDEQ officials describing a possible
communications strategy for MDEQ officials about the Del Toral memo (Lynch, J., 2016,
March 29): "So if the Legislature or whoever might say you all were CC'd, you can
truthfully respond that it was the EPA's request that the report not be sent to the CC's.
Consequently, you all never received the report from Miguel" (Howes, D. 2016, Feb. 13).
While the story about high lead levels in Flint was starting to draw media
attention, discussions about Legionnaires’ disease were occurring within the confines of
state institutional actors, away from the public eye. According to Eric Brown, deputy
director of federal relations for Gov. Snyder, on Sept. 18 he participated in a conference
call with state officials. During the call, MDHHS’s Nick Lyon “indicated there was an
increase” in Legionnaires’ disease cases in Flint (Fonger, R., 2018, May 9). Others
participating in the call included State Treasurer Nick Khouri, MDEQ’s Brad Wurfel, and
Snyder aides Harvey Hollins and Dennis Muchmore. Lyon said that although a rise had
been noted, 73 percent of cases occurred in people who lived outside of Flint and there
was no certainty that the spike was directly related to the Flint River water switch
(Fleming, L., 2018, May 8).
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The Children
Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha did not get information from the state on children’s
lead levels, so she used the information that she had access to. She compared her
patients’ blood lead levels from before and after the April 2014 water switch and found
enough of an increase to warrant holding a press conference on Sept. 24 to warn the
community of a possible health emergency (Associated Press 2015, Sept. 25) .
Before the Hurley Medical Center press conference occurred, Nick Lyon made
the following statement: “I would like to make a strong statement with a demonstration
of proof that the lead blood levels seen are not out of the ordinary and are attributable
to seasonal fluctuations” (Fonger, R., 2017, June 15). At the press conference Dr. HannaAttisha presented her findings and her remarks were followed by a statement by
GCHD’s Marc Valacak (Associated Press 2015, Sept. 25). In response to the information
released during the Hurley Medical Center announcement, MDEQ’s Brad Wurfel
lamented that the water controversy was coming close to becoming “hysteria” and
affirmed, "Flint's drinking water is safe in that it's meeting federal and state standards"
(Associated Press 2015, Sept. 25).

Institutional Acknowledgment: The Lead Problem
Governor Snyder got a briefing on the Flint Water Crisis on Sept. 28 (Fonger, R.,
2016, Feb. 28). According to Dennis Muchmore, he personally pressured Nick Lyon to
peruse the Hurley Medical Center and Virginia Tech reports (Livengood, C. 2016, Jan.
16). After a second review of outside research, state agencies recanted their previous
statements and confirmed that there was a rise in blood lead levels when they looked at
Flint zip codes alone (Fonger, R., 2016, Feb. 28). The governor’s office engaged in a crisis
response consisting of an Oct. 2-announcement consisting of an action plan for
addressing the lead problem (Fonger, R., 2015, Oct. 2) and the creation of a bipartisan
task force to investigate government agencies’ actions leading to the water quality
emergency (Oosting, J. 2016, Feb. 23). Liane Shekter Smith was moved to a different
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role and later fired. On Oct. 15, the governor signed a bill that designated funds to
contribute in helping Flint to switch back to using Detroit’s service, which provided
water from Lake Huron (Oosting, J., 2016, Feb. 24).
In November, Richard Baird, senior advisor to the governor, reached out to
Michigan State Police Director Col. Kriste Kibbey Etue. In his message he said that, if
possible, the governor favored avoiding a disaster declaration and that Dan Wyant, Nick
Lyon and he were “working on it” (Fonger, R. 2017, October 8). Halfway through the
month Howard Croft, who had led the city's public works department since Mike Brown
appointed him in 2011, resigned abruptly (Ridley, 2016, January 19). In his resignation
letter he addressed the city’s transition period and efforts to gain back lost trust.
Additionally, he alluded to difficulties experienced by the city government employees:
I would also like to applaud all of the departmental employees who by not fault
of their own have encountered drastic changes in staffing, equipment, and work
environment, yet they continue to provide daily services to the absolute best of
their ability. Again, it has been an honor to serve alongside such a talented group
of professionals (Fonger, R. 2015, Nov. 17) .

Pressure Building on Legionnaires’ Disease
On the last day of the month Genesee County officials sent a draft press release
alerting Flint residents about a surge in Legionnaires’ disease illnesses in Genesee
County since the water switch to Darren Lytle, the EPA’s Legionella expert, for review
(Livengood and Bouffard, 2016, Feb. 12). On December 1, Lytle’s message was
redirected across state lines and governmental institutions. He first sent the press
release draft to other EPA colleagues remarking that he had connected with the right
group of people:
I have been trying to get to the bottom of reports of increases in reported cases
of Legionnaires' Disease in Genesee County and finally reached the correct
people…They shared some data that is very concerning and although they can't
pinpoint the exact source of Legionella, drinking water can't be ruled out
(Livengood and Bouffard, 2016, Feb. 12).
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Lytle’s email was shared with other agencies. Later that day CDC’s Laurel
Garrison reached out to MDHHS’s Jim Collins (who in June had reminded Genesee
County that any requests for DCD assistance should come from his state agency) along
with other state officials to clarify the extent of the role her agency had had in the
Legionnaires’ disease outbreak:
As you're aware, we haven't received a formal report from MDHHS and haven't
received a request to review anything in any formal or informal way since June.
Of course, we are ready to assist if there is a need, but I'm concerned that this
statement is misrepresenting CDC's current involvement (Livengood and
Bouffard, 2016, Feb. 12).
Genesee County’s Health Officer, Mark Valacak, later got a conference call
request from MDHHS’s Eden Wells and Sue Moran. According to Valacak, Wells said that
she thought the county and the state and county agencies were a team and they should
issue a joint news release (Fonger, R., 2017, Aug. 10). In a Dec. 4-memo to Genesee
County co-workers, Jim Henry stated that the CDC’s assistance was needed and drew
attention to date discrepancies on Jim Collins’s June 2015 Legionnaires’ disease
outbreak declaration:
I think the Executive Summary was probably written on 6/4 and pre-dated 5/29. I
wonder what the Executive Summary created date shows on his computer.
MDHHS kept screwing up the clinical specimens in the lab, so CDC agreed to
provide assistance. Jim Collins was well aware that we were making progress in
this area with CDC. Some of the people at the state agencies are simply
criminals! (Bouffard, K., 2016, April 27).
On Sunday, December 13, 2015, 85-year-old Robert Skidmore, who had become
markedly ill since his visit to McLaren hospital the previous May, passed away.
According to his death certificate, Skidmore perished from “end stage congestive heart
failure” with diabetes listed as a contributing cause (Fleming, L. and Oosting, J, 2017,
June 15).
Although the winter holiday season tends to be a slow time for many
government agencies, some Michigan state officials were working. According to Snyder
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aide Jim Hollins, he participated in a Dec. 24 conference call with the governor, Richard
Baird and three others, not including Nick Lyon. During the call, Hollins discussed
concerns he had heard about the Legionnaires’ disease outbreak (Fleming, L. 2017, Nov.
2). On Dec. 29, the last Tuesday of 2015, the Flint Water Advisory Task Force that Gov.
Snyder had created the previous October released a letter outlining its preliminary
findings. That same day MDEQ’s Dan Wyant and Brad Wurfel resigned (Lynch, Livengood
and Carah 2016) and the governor hired Keith Creagh to take over as director of MDEQ
(Burke, M. N., 2016, Jan. 30).

New Year, More Scandal
On the first Tuesday of 2016, Jan. 5, Gov. Snyder declared a state of emergency
in Genesee County (Fonger, R., 2016, Jan. 21; Ridley, G. 2016, January 20). According to
Dennis Muchmore, MDHHS’s Nick Lyon informed the governor about the Legionnaires’
disease outbreak on Jan. 11, 2016 (Livengood, C. 2016, Jan. 16). Additionally, on Jan. 11
Snyder signed an executive order that established a multi-agency, non-public committee
was that was to be responsible for generating an action plan to help guarantee that the
drinking water was safe and dealing with the expected after-effects of raised lead levels.
The following day, Jan. 12, 2016, Governor Snyder asked FEMA for a federal
“interagency recovery plan,” a request that was approved expeditiously and began by
having a disaster recovery coordinator for the state appointed (Lynch and Oosting
2016). Before the end of the day, the governor activated the National Guard (Lynch and
Oosting 2016).

Institutional Acknowledgement: Legionnaires’ Disease Outbreak
Wednesday, January 13, 2015 was a turning point in the story of the Flint Water
Crisis. That morning Snyder administration aides briefed and solicited feedback from Jim
Ananich, the Democratic Senate Minority Leader from Flint as well as other state
lawmakers (Lynch and Oosting 2016). From Detroit (Fleming, L., 2017, Oct. 7), the
governor held a “hastily arranged” (Lynch and Oosting 2016) press conference to inform
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the public about an increase in Legionnaires’ disease cases that occurred in Genesee
County since the City of Flint began drawing water from the Flint River.
Nick Lyons and Eden Wells participated in the press conference and proclaimed
that it was not known if there was a clear cause-and-effect relationship between the
illness and the river water (Lynch and Oosting 2016). The conference press kits
contained a fact sheet that described what was missing to make a definitive connection
between the Legionella increase and the corrosive Flint River water:
The state laboratory, in fact, had 12 clinical isolates from Legionnaires' patients
in Flint, the state health department confirmed. Of those isolates, molecular
typing was completed on the eight that tested positive for Legionella.
Investigators could then search for a DNA match in the environment. But since
water samples were never tested, there was nothing to compare the clinical
isolates with (Bouffard, K., 2016, Feb. 24).
The governor’s press conference announcing the Legionnaires’ disease outbreaks
was a sort of second assault to a community that was already struggling with health
concerns due to the water, this time, instead of potential long-term effects, people had
died due to the actions taken by government institutions. Two days after the Legionella
announcement, Michigan Attorney General Bill Schuette declared that his office would
investigate whether any state laws were violated in relation to the water crisis. In
addition to the attorney general’s investigation, the EPA’s Office of Inspector General
announced an inquiry into the agency’s role in the crisis (Fonger, R., 2018, March 8). On
Jan. 16, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Detroit verified rumors that the Federal District
office was also looking into the crisis. Gina Balaya, spokesperson for Detroit’s U.S.
Attorney’s office stated, "Our policy has always been that we neither confirm nor deny
investigations; however, the nature of this situation warranted an exception to that
policy” (Livengood, C. 2016, Jan. 16).
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Epilog
Some recent updates follow.


Governor Snyder released the City of Flint from state receivership in April 2018.



Attorney General Schuette left office in January 2019, replaced by Dana Nessel. The
following June, she dropped the eight remaining pending charges, explaining that
prosecutors and investigators expressed grave concerns about the investigative
approach and legal theories. Nessel pledged to continue the investigation (Smith
2019).



In July 2019, the Harvard Kennedy School’s Taubman Center for State and Local
Government announced the appointment of former governor Rick Snyder to a
yearlong senior fellowship (Larkin 2019). Within days of the announcement, Snyder
removed himself from the fellowship amid a backlash over his role in Flint’s Water
Crisis (Vigdor 2019).



The City of Flint takes drinking water from Lake Huron. But many residents are still
drinking bottled water because many lead pipelines in the city’s water distribution
system have yet to be replaced.
How far did Flint get away from another financial meltdown? Did two bouts of

state receivership revive the city’s economic base, improve the quality of its services or
schools, and restore public health? As of July 2019, not far and not much (McCann
2019). Flint’s overall rank on operating efficiency was 146 out of 150 of the nation’s
largest cities. The city also ranked 150 in economy, 146 in quality of city services, 141 in
education, and 138 in health (McCann 2019).
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CHAPTER 4
INSTITUTIONAL FAILURES AND ENVIRONMENTAL ILLNESS
The Flint Water Crisis is the direct result of the failure of multiple government
institutions in Michigan. The general question I address through Freudenburg’s lens of
recreancy is: How are we to understand the failures of institutional actors to perform
their duties adequately?
Freudenburg’s invaluable insight is the paradox of contemporary society’s
complex, interdependent division of labor. It has produced unprecedented wealth and
lengthened life expectancies. At the same time, however, the division of labor has
substantially increased vulnerability to institutional failure. Freudenburg referred to this
institutional failure with the more neutral term of “recreancy,” which he defined as “the
“behaviors of persons and/or of institutions that hold positions of trust, agency,
responsibility, or fiduciary or other forms of broadly expected obligations to the
collectivity, but that behave in a manner that fails to fulfill the obligations or merit the
trust they enjoy” (1993:916–17).
Freudenburg urged analysts to adopt the institutional unit of analysis and focus
on the behaviors of institutional actors as they are influenced by institutional
arrangements. I developed two research questions that represent his conceptualization
of recreancy and use them to structure my analysis:


Is the level of institutional resources adequate for enabling officials to carry out
their responsibilities with the degree of vigor necessary to merit the societal
trust they enjoy?



What behaviors by which institutional actors resulted in recreancy?
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Institutional Resources
RQ1. Is the level of institutional resources adequate for enabling officials to carry
out their responsibilities with the degree of vigor necessary to merit the societal trust
they enjoy?
The institutional context underlying the Flint Water Crisis is neoliberal
governance with an agenda featuring minimal government, balanced budgets,
deregulation, and a shift away from state welfare provision. When public debt is
deemed to be too high, accounts are balanced through austerity measures, by raising
revenues and cutting spending (Azar 2015)., typically by slashing social programs. Just as
austerity regimes are imposed on developing countries by developed countries, they are
also imposed on bankrupt cities by state governments in this country.
Neoliberal ideologies, “produced and reproduced through institutional forms”
(Peck and Tickell 2002: 383), become embedded within national, regional, and local
contexts (Brenner and Theodore 2002: 351). Neoliberalism is a comprehensive cultural
orientation that permeates perceptions and is commonly accepted (Harvey 2007 ). The
acceptance of austerity measures is frequently associated with the loss of sovereignty.
Neoliberalism in Michigan was clearly expressed in Governor Snyder’s campaign
promises and subsequent economic policies. A fiscal conservative, Snyder kept the state
budget afloat in part by changing the rules of statutory revenue sharing, taking funds
away from cities. He imposed an austerity program on financially struggling cities by
placing them in state receivership and appointing emergency managers with the
authority to overrule local elected officials. Cities were forced to relinquish their
sovereignty.
This institutional context of neoliberalism and austerity shaped decisions about
the resources available to Genesee County and the City of Flint. I discuss that state of
resources regarding staff numbers, necessary equipment, access to expert knowledge,
and funding.
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The City of Flint Utilities Department was severely understaffed, and many
personnel were undertrained, inexperienced with full-time plant operations, and illprepared to manage complex water chemistry issues (FWATF 2016). Full-time use of
Flint’s water distribution system stopped in 1967 when the city began purchasing water
from the Detroit Water and Sewer Department. Consequently, the entire outdated
system should have been significantly modernized before restarting it, it was not.
The city and county were forced to rely on MDEQ for expert knowledge. Instead
of the information they needed, city and county officials received mostly vague, and
sometimes inaccurate, feedback on their inquiries.
Funding was a major problem in both state and city government institutions.
MDEQ’s Office of Drinking Water and Municipal Assistance, charged with regulating the
state’s community water systems, was responsible for a greater number of community
water systems than were other states in EPA’s Region V. Although all of Region V states’
water system regulators were financially strained, Michigan was worse-off: the state
charged lower fees for the program, requiring it to rely on general funds and federal
revenues (Flint Water Advisory Task Force 2016).
After nearly a year’s worth of citizen complaints about water quality, the City
Council in 2015 voted to reconnect Flint to Detroit water. But emergency manager
Ambrose publicly stated that he found the Council’s vote “incomprehensible,” given the
$12 million annual fee that returning to Detroit’s water service would cost (Fonger, R.,
2014, March 24). Treasurer Secretary Andy Dillon “concluded the cost to reconnect Flint
to Detroit water—an extra $1 million per month—was deemed more than the caststrapped city of Flint could afford” (Livengood, C., 2016, Feb. 26).

The Individual Behaviors of Institutional Actors
RQ2. What behaviors by which institutional actors resulted in recreancy?
In March 2013, MDEQ Director Dan Wyant wrote to Treasurer Secretary Andy
Dillon that MDEQ supported the plan to replace DWSD with the Karegnondi Authority as
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Flint’s water source (Ridley, G., 2016, Feb. 14). Dillon then notified the Governor of his
approval of the plan. Flint emergency manager Ed Kurtz signed the agreement with KWA
in April and notified Dillon that he was evaluating options for temporary water sources
and inclined to choose the Flint River (Oosting, J., 2016, March 30).
Freudenburg emphasized the behavior of institutional actors that leads to
recreant outcomes. I identified three pivotal institutional decisions in the making of the
Flint Water Crisis, and here I describe the actions of the individual officials who
participated in the decision.

Rushing the Switch Despite Concerns
Officials from MDEQ and the City of Flint expressed serious concerns about the
quality of Flint River water prior to the switchover. In January 2013, MDEQ’s District
Supervisor of the Office of Drinking Water and Municipal Assistance, Mike Prysby,
communicated his unease about water quality with Liane Shekter Smith, Chief of that
office. Several months later, Stephen Busch, District Engineer in the same office warned
MDEQ Director Dan Wyant and Liane Shekter Smith that Flint River water posed
significant public health risks. Just before the April 2014 switchover to Flint’s aged water
treatment system, Michael Glasgow, the City of Flint’s Supervisor of Laboratory and
Water Quality, cautioned the Governor’s office that the rush to launch full-time
production at Flint’s water treatment plant "could lead to some big potential disasters
down the road" (Oosting, J., 2016, March 30).
Despite the warning signs, Flint Department of Public Works Director Howard
Croft and utilities administrator Duffy Johnson cited budgetary constraints in denying
Glasgow’s request to delay the switchover for six months so he could better prepare the
water treatment plant (Oosting, J., 2016, March 30).
Incidents in the first six months after the switchover failed to persuade officials
of the hazardous risks presented by drawing the city’s drinking water from the Flint
River. In August 2014, water sampled from the Flint water distribution system was
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found to violate standards for E. coli and fecal coliform bacteria. The city issued a local
advisory to boil tap water before using and added more bacteria-killing chlorine at the
water treatment plant. A month later, General Motors notified city officials that its Flint
Engine Operations facility would no longer use Flint water because the level of chlorine
in the water corroded auto parts. MDEQ responded with a statement asserting that the
chlorine in Flint’s water was within public health guidelines. In January 2015, MDEQ
cited the city for violating water standards for total trihalomethanes (TTHM), a
carcinogen caused by an overload of chlorine.
Flint residents lodged complaints about the water quality and public health risks.
Many called for a return to DWSD water. But, in March, Flint emergency manager
Gerald Ambrose rejected the call because of the costs.

No Corrosion Control
The highly corrosive water from the Flint River left the water treatment plant
without the addition of corrosive control chemicals. The corrosive water coursing
through Flint’s old lead service lines eroded the biofilm attached to the inner surface of
the line. Bacteria were released into the water and multiplied; eventually, the corrosive
water caused lead, copper, and iron to leach from the service line. If corrosion control
chemicals had been added at the water treatment plant, damage to the lines would not
have occurred.
In March 2014, prior to water switch, Glasgow, supervisor at Flint’s water
treatment plant, had assumed that the water treatment plant would need to add
corrosion control chemicals, which would have required a six-month delay to preparing
the plant. He asked Adam Rosenthal, a MDEQ water quality analyst for guidance on
water quality monitoring parameters and information about lead and copper
monitoring.
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April 2014, Glasgow again contacted Rosenthal for information, copying Mike
Prysby, Supervisor in the Office of Drinking Water and Municipal Assistance, and
Stephen Busch, Prysby’s supervisor.
Two months later, Rosenthal responded to Glasgow’s message, stating that
orthophosphate monitoring would not be needed because the chemicals were not being
added to the water system [CITE]. Glasgow trusted MDEQ to inform him if any changes
were needed (Oosting, J., 2016, March 30).
In October 2014, Valerie Brader, Governor Snyder’s environmental policy
adviser, forwarded to MDEQ Director Dan Wyant an article reporting General Motors’
withdrawal from Flint’s water distribution system because of the corrosiveness of the
water. She wrote: “This underscores the need for the folks from DEQ to talk to the EM in
Flint and to make sure a blended water solution is being explored” (Livengood, C., 2016,
Feb. 26).
Brader also shared the article with officials in the Governor’s Office: Chief Legal
Counsel Mike Gandola, Chief of Staff Dennis Muchmore, Deputy Chief of Staff Beth
Clement, and Communications Director Jarrod Agen. She noted that she had purposely
omitted MDEQ from the email thread to protect the exchange among the governor’s
staff from the state’s Freedom of Information Act.
In February of 2015, Jennifer Crooks, EPA Region V Ground Water and Drinking
Water Branch’s program manager of Michigan’s water distribution system, emailed
MDEQ’s Stephen Busch suggesting that Flint’s corrosive water was leaching heavy
metals from the inside surfaces of the pipelines (Fonger, R., 2016, Feb. 28). She stated
that Flint’s water system was required to have “Optimal Corrosion Control Treatment”
(OCCT) (Howes, D. 2016, Feb. 13). The following day, Miguel Del Toral, an EPA Region V
groundwater regulation manager, asked Busch whether OCCT was used in Flint’s water
system (Lynch, J., 2016, April 18). Busch replied in the affirmative without specifying any
details (Lynch, J., 2016, April 18; Clark, A. 2018, July 15).
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In April 2015, Busch’s claim was refuted in an email exchange between Del Toral
and Patrick Cook, an engineer with MDEQ’s Community Drinking Water Unit. Del Toral
asked Cook about corrosion control treatment in Flint. Cook replied that the water plant
was not practicing corrosion control (NRDC/ACLU petition to EPA, 2015, Oct. 1). He
described MDEQ’s incorrect understanding of the lead and copper rule: “If it is
determined that Flint has to install corrosion control treatment, the rule allows up to
two years to complete a study and an additional two years to install the treatment
unless we set a shorter time” (Howes, D. 2016, Feb. 13).
Del Toral expressed his concern to Cook about the lack of corrosion control
treatment and high lead levels, explaining that, based on his interpretation of the Lead
and Copper Rule, Flint did not meet eligibility for opting out of using corrosion control
treatments (Anderson et al v. Wyant et al, 2018, Feb. 22).
Cook and Busch exchanged emailed complaints about Del Toral's inquiries about
corrosion control treatment. Busch and other MDEQ officials wrote emails indicating
they did not welcome Del Toral's continued questioning of their methods. Busch wrote,
“If he continues to persist, we may need Liane or Director Wyant to make a call to EPA
to help address his over-reaches" (Lynch, J., 2016, April 18). Cook responded, “I agree,
the constant second guessing of how we interpret and implement our rules is getting
tiresome” (Shamus, 2016, Feb. 14).
In July, MDEQ performed an abrupt about-face and determined that Corrosion
Control Treatment was needed, specifically phosphates should be added. Glasgow
privately remarked to Croft: "We originally had this chemical in the design, but the DEQ
did not mandate it from the start, they informed us to wait and see the results of our
lead and copper sampling to determine if it was necessary” (Fonger, R., 2016, March
11).
MDEQ’s hand was finally forced in September, when Dr. Mark Edwards,
Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering at Virginia Tech, released his findings
based on water samples from 300 Flint homes that the drinking water was causing lead
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contaminations in homes (Fonger, R. 2015, Sept. 2). MDEQ immediately issued a press
release claiming that “the lead levels being detected in Flint drinking water are not
coming from the treatment plant or the city’s transmission lines” (Snyder RICO Lawsuit,
2016, April 6, p. 52). Instead, the agency contends, the issue is whether and how
drinking water interacts with the lead plumbing in residences.
On September 3, Flint Director of Public Works, Howard Croft, informed city and
state officials that the city had implemented the appropriate Corrosion Control
Treatment and was in compliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act (Ridley, G., 2016,
Feb. 14; Lynch, J. 2016, Feb. 10).

Not Enlisting Aid from EPA and CDC
The standard protocol for intervention by federal agencies into state affairs
dictates that state officials must invite the federal agencies’ participation. Michigan’s
state agencies would likely have benefited from the resources and expertise of the EPA
and CDC. Yet several incidents in 2015 demonstrate state officials’ opposition to such
interventions.
In February 2015, a Genesee County Health Department official contacted EPA
for information and aid about the county’s outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease. The EPA
official then communicated the county official’s concerns to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC). Perceiving the seriousness of the outbreak, CDC officials
contacted MDHHS to offer its assistance in the form of epidemiologic and laboratory
support at its Atlanta headquarters or in Michigan. MDHHS officials rejected the offer,
insisting that they had the situation under control (Livengood, C., 2016, Feb. 12; Fonger,
R., 2016, Feb. 16; Livengood, C., 2016, Feb. 12).
Busch and other DEQ officials traded emails in April, sharing the sentiment that
Del Toral’s continued questioning of their methods was unwelcome. Busch wrote, “If he
continues to persist, we may need Liane or Director Wyant to make a call to EPA to help
address his over-reaches" (Lynch, J., 2016, April 18). Cook responded, “I agree, the
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constant second guessing of how we interpret and implement our rules is getting
tiresome” (Shamus, 2016, Feb. 14).
On June 4, 2015, MDHHS Director of the Communicable Disease Division, Jim
Collins, informed Genesee County health officials that requests for assistance from the
CDC could only originate in the state-level health agency, not the county (Livengood, C.,
2016, Feb. 12).
After the ACLU broke the lead story in July, Flint resident LeeAnne Walters
received a phone call from Del Toral, with whom she had worked on the lead crisis: “He
was telling me that he couldn't talk to me anymore…He said he couldn't talk to anybody
from Flint or about Flint" (Lynch, J., 2016, March 29).
CDC officials in December again offered assistance to MDHHS: “As you're aware,
we haven't received a formal report from MDHHS and haven't received a request to
review anything in any formal or informal way since June. Of course, we are ready to
assist if there is a need” (Livengood, C., 2016, Feb. 12). Again, their offer was not
accepted.

Discussion and Conclusions
I began with a general question: How are we to understand the failures of
institutional actors to perform their duties adequately? I applied Freudenburg’s term for
institutional failure, recreancy, to a case study of the Flint Water Crisis. The proximate
causes of the crisis were a polluted source of city drinking water, an outdated water
distribution system, and the improper treatment of corrosive water. The distal causes
were Flint’s long-term financial problems and the political maneuvering of individual
Michigan officials. Denied local control through democratically elected city council and
mayoral authority. The emergency manager policy, in its current operation, denies
citizens—primarily African-Americans—local, elected democratic control.
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Multi-Institutional Interactions
Despite the unmistakable connection between the quality of drinking water and public
health, there is no liaison between MDEQ and MDHHS to ensure that complaints or
concerns about water are brought to the attention of MDHHS staff in a timely fashion to
prompt investigative action. The lack of a liaison function within state government also
adversely affected the response to cases of Legionellosis.
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Appendix A: Hierarchy
Government Institutional Hierarchies
Federal
Environmental Protection Agency
State of Michigan
Office of the Governor
Department of Health and Human Services
Chief Medical Executive
State Epidemiologist and Director of the Bureau of
Epidemiology
Michigan Maternal, Infant and Early Childhood
Home Visiting
Michigan Healthy Homes and Lead Poisoning
Prevention
Data Manager
Department of Environmental Quality
Office of Drinking Water and Municipal Assistance
District Supervisor
District Engineer
Specialist for the Community Water
Drinking Unit
Water Quality Analyst
Department of the Treasury
Flint Emergency Manager
Genesee County
Board of Commissioners
Health Department
City of Flint
City Council
Department of Public Works
Drinking Water Program
Water Quality

74

Appendix B: Charges
Criminal Investigation Charges
Name
Michael
Prysby

Institution

Title

MDEQ

Investigation
Overall FWC

Date
Charged
April 20,
2016

Charges



Tampering with evidence



Conspiracy
o Tampering with evidence



Engaging in a treatment violation that
violates the Michigan Safe Drinking
Water Act



Engaging in a monitoring violation that
violates the Michigan Safe Drinking
Water Act

Stephen
Busch

MDEQ

District Supervisor

Overall FWC

April 20,
2016



Misconduct in office (two counts)



Tampering with evidence



Conspiracy
o Tampering with evidence

75



Engaging in a treatment violation that
violates the Michigan Safe Drinking
Water Act



Engaging in a monitoring violation that
violates the Michigan Safe Drinking
Water Act

Michael
Glasgow

Liane Shekter
Smith

Adam
Rosenthal

City of
Flint

MDEQ

MDEQ

Laboratory and Water Quality
Supervisor

Chief of Office of Drinking Water
and Municipal Assistance

Water Quality Analyst

Overall FWC

Overall FWC

Legionnaires’
Disease Outbreak
Overall FWC

June 14,
2017
April 20,
2016

July 29,
2016

June 14,
2017
July 29,
2016



Misconduct in office (one count)



Felony involuntary manslaughter



Tampering with evidence



Willful neglect of duty



Misconduct in office



Willful neglect of duty



Felony involuntary manslaughter



Misconduct in office



Tampering with evidence



Conspiracy
o Tampering with evidence
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o Willful neglect of duty
Patrick Cook

Nancy Peeler

Robert Scott

Corrine Miller

Darnell Earley

MDEQ

MDHHS

MDHHS

MDHHS

City of
Flint

Specialist for the Community
Water Drinking Unit

Director, Michigan Maternal,
Infant and Early Childhood Home
Visiting

Data Manager, Michigan Healthy
Homes and Lead Poisoning
Prevention

State Epidemiologist

Emergency Manager

Overall FWC

Overall FWC

Overall FWC

Overall FWC

Overall FWC
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July 29,
2016

July 29,
2016

July 29,
2016

July 29,
2016

Dec. 20,
2016



Misconduct in office



Conspiracy



Willful neglect of duty



Misconduct in office



Conspiracy



Willful neglect of duty



Misconduct in office



Conspiracy



Willful neglect of duty



Misconduct in office



Conspiracy



Willful neglect of duty



False pretenses



Conspiracy to commit false pretenses



Misconduct in office

Legionnaires’
Disease Outbreak

Gerald
Ambrose

Howard Croft

Daughterty
Johnson

Nick Lyon

Eden Wells,
MD

City of
Flint

City of
Flint

Emergency Manager

Director of Public Works

MDHHS

Overall FWC

Legionnaires’
Disease Outbreak
Overall FWC

City of
Flint

MDHHS

Overall FWC

Director

Chief Medical Executive

Legionnaires’
disease outbreak

Legionnaires’
disease outbreak
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June 14,
2017
June 14,
2017
Dec. 20,
2016

Dec. 20,
2016

June 14,
2017
Dec. 20,
2016

June 14,
2017

June 14,
2017



Willful neglect of duty



Felony involuntary manslaughter



Felony involuntary manslaughter



False pretenses



Conspiracy to commit false pretenses



Misconduct in office



Willful neglect of duty



False pretenses



Conspiracy to commit false pretenses



Felony involuntary manslaughter



False pretenses



Conspiracy to commit false pretenses



Felony involuntary manslaughter



Misconduct in office



Obstruction of justice

Legionnaires’
Disease Outbreak
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Oct. 9,
2017



Lying to a police officer



Felony involuntary manslaughter
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